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Abstract 
This study analyzes the loss potential arising from investments into CDS for a sample of large U.S. and 
German mutual funds. Further, it investigates whether the comments funds make on CDS use in 
periodic fund reports are consistent with the disclosed CDS holdings. For several funds in the U.S., the 
potential losses arising from selling CDS protection are almost as high as net assets, while in 
Germany, this potential can be even higher. Regarding the information funds provide to investors 
about their use of CDS, the results of the study suggest that comments on CDS contained in periodic 
reports are often unspecific and sometimes misleading. Thus, investors might have to analyze 
portfolio holdings in order to learn about the true investment behavior of funds. For instance, in 
Germany, funds that use more short than long CDS often state that they only use long CDS for 
hedging purposes. Based on the results, it seems advisable that regulators in both countries tighten 
rules restricting the speculative use of derivatives by funds to a reasonable level, as well as 
implement more standardized disclosure policies. 
JEL-Classification: G11, G15, G23, G28 
Key Words: Mutual funds, leverage, derivative, credit default swaps, disclosure
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1 Introduction 
Can funds default solely due to their investments in derivatives? How accurate is the information 
funds provide to investors about their derivative use? In recent years, highly regulated market 
participants, including mutual funds, were heavily exposed to risk via derivatives. The majority of 
corporate bond funds in the U.S. that sold more credit default swaps (CDS) protection than they 
bought suffered severe losses compared to funds that predominantly bought CDS protection during 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis (Adam and Guettler (2014)). The Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund 
nearly collapsed in 2008 because of speculative investments into CDS and faced lawsuits concerning 
inadequate disclosure.1 These developments follow from the fact that CDS are not only used for 
hedging, but also for implementing risky investment strategies that potentially create either high 
returns or losses. For instance, whenever a fund sells protection via CDS, it effectively adds leverage 
to its portfolio, because it is exposed to the notional amount of the swaps beyond its total net assets. 
This study analyzes the loss potential of CDS holdings at U.S. and German funds along with the CDS 
related disclosure under the regulation existing during the time period of the 2007-2009 financial 
crisis. The goal of this study is to determine whether investors in both countries should worry about 
funds potentially taking extensive risks via derivatives and misinforming the public about their 
investments. Although mutual funds are highly regulated in both countries, they can implement 
speculative strategies by selling CDS, which undermines the effectiveness of investor protection 
offered by regulation.2 From the European side, this study focuses on mutual funds distributed in 
Germany as they follow EU-wide regulation3 and have been allowed to use credit derivatives since 
2004. In addition, mutual funds in Germany are obliged to list the cumulated amounts of individual 
securities sold within the period in annual and semi-annual reports. These data provide unique 
insights into fund activities within the period. On the contrary, U.S. funds only report the overall 
portfolio turnover rate.  
The purpose of this study is threefold. First, I empirically analyze the level of CDS use and the 
potential for realizing losses via CDS for a sample of U.S. and German corporate bond funds under the 
1
 See “Recovering Oppenheimer Champion Fund Losses” and “Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund Lawsuits” 
[http://www.oppenheimerfundfraud.com/id3.html, http://www.youhavealawyer.com/blog/2009/04/16/oppenheimer-
champion-income-fund-lawsuits/, respectively, visited on 08.09.2012]. 
2
 Managers, especially those of poorly performing funds (but not exclusively), often face strong incentives to increase the 
riskiness of their funds as their salary (and position) depends on the development of a fund’s assets. It is well documented 
that managers succeeding in fund tournaments and fund family tournaments attract more inflows from investors and 
support from a fund family (e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Taylor (2003), Kempf and 
Ruenzi (2008), and Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2009)). 
3




                                                          
 
regulation existing during the financial crisis. Second, based on period-end and within-period data, 
which are only available for German funds, I investigate to which extent end-of-period CDS holdings 
are representative of a fund’s investment behavior during the period. Third, I examine the accuracy of 
the information funds provide to investors about their CDS policies. 
Although many rules are related to the use of derivatives, funds have a high level of flexibility when 
designing their investment strategies under both U.S. and German regulation: According to 
Gałkiewicz (2014), U.S. and German funds might increase their derivative investments up to the point 
at which it is possible for them to default solely due to derivatives. Thus, losses generated by the 
Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund in 2008, which were largely due to its CDS positions and 
reached almost 80% of its value, were in accordance with the existing regulatory limits on derivative 
use. 
Given the high regulatory flexibility, it is interesting to empirically investigate the actual CDS holdings 
and disclosures of mutual funds. I analyze the 30 largest U.S. and German corporate bond funds (as 
determined by total net asset value (TNA) in 2004) included in the CRSP and BVI databases as they 
have the widest investor base.4 Annual and semi-annual U.S. filings are obtained from the SEC, while 
German reports are directly provided by the funds. From these reports, I collect data on the funds’ 
net assets as well as the notional and market values of CDS. 
The results show that between 2004 and 2010, the use of long and short CDS positions (buying and 
selling CDS protection) was extensive and increased over time for funds in both countries. However, 
German funds, which have been allowed to use CDS only since 2004, had significantly higher and 
more varying CDS positions (measured by CDS notional amounts as a fraction of a fund’s TNA) than 
their U.S. counterparts, especially after EU regulation took full effect in Germany in 2007. As 
indicated by the negative CDS net notional amounts (long – short positions) at period end, both U.S. 
and German funds often took on more risk via CDS than they hedged. This was especially pronounced 
during the 2007-2009 financial crisis where the CDS market peaked (BIS Quartely Review (2004, 
2013)). For example, the highest (unrealized) reported loss due to CDS at reporting date equaled 
-8.10% (-1.63%) of TNA for U.S. (German) funds during the crisis. This is substantial given that 
corporate bond funds generated returns between -2.82% and 2.97% during the same time period 
(Adam and Guettler (2014)). According to U.S. regulation, which measures the loss potential of selling 
CDS protection by the sum of notional amounts, potential losses reached up to 93.82% of TNA for 
U.S. funds (127.04% of TNA for German funds) during the crisis. Even if the potential losses are 
4
 I thank Lehmann and Stehle (2013) for kindly providing me with the data on TNA for German funds. 
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measured more conservatively by negative CDS net notional amounts, they still reached up to 58.54% 
of TNA for U.S. funds (93.19% of TNA for German funds) during this time. This further implies that 
direct leverage restrictions, which limit bank borrowing to 10% and 33.3% of a fund’s TNA in 
Germany/the EU and the U.S., respectively, can be circumvented. Funds can inflate overall leverage 
by using derivatives, such as CDS, to levels above the value of their net assets. Furthermore, even if 
the size of the CDS holdings of U.S. and German funds are in line with regulation, it remains unknown 
to which extent these holdings are used by funds for speculation. Evidence from this study shows that 
investors could, in the worst case, lose their entire investment due to a fund’s exposure to CDS. Thus, 
it might be worthwhile to tighten rules restricting the speculative use of derivatives by funds to a 
reasonable level in both countries (which should be determined by the regulator in the best interest 
of the majority of mutual fund investors). The majority of U.S. and German funds, which keep levels 
of long and short CDS measured by notional amounts below 15% of their net assets, would not be 
affected by this change. Tighter rules could, however, prevent potentially high losses due to outliers 
in the mutual fund industry.5 Additionally, future research should shed light on the determinants of 
within-country variations in derivative use and relate them to cross-country variations. 
In their reports, German funds are obliged to list the cumulated amounts of individual securities sold 
within the last period (including derivatives). By analyzing within-period data for German funds, I find 
that the purchases and sales of CDS observable from one period-end to the other only explained a 
fraction (37.34%) of the average (or 32.72% of the median) of aggregate CDS purchases and sales 
implied by period-end and within-period data. Overall, the above evidence suggests that 
management undertakes many undetectable round-trip CDS trades (purchases followed by sales or 
the other way around) within a period. This is concerning given the fact that almost half of the 
observed cumulative amounts of CDS traded over the course of a period (either small amounts 
turned over frequently or large amounts turned over infrequently) were higher than a fund’s average 
CDS holdings as implied by period-end data. Interestingly, some funds repeatedly traded CDS in the 
second half of the calendar year between 2007 and 2010. However, definite conclusions about 
speculation require information about the portfolio holdings of funds and a wider database.  
Finally, I analyze the information funds provide to investors about their CDS use. The mandatory CDS 
related comments provided in the notes of U.S. fund reports were very comprehensive compared to 
the almost nonexistent, voluntary report comments of German funds. The comparison of comments 
in annual and semi-annual fund reports with CDS holdings reveals that all CDS strategies mentioned 
5
 The new regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives implemented via the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) in the U.S., and 
AIFMD (2011) and EMIR (2012) in Germany address the potential for counterparty risk to arise through derivative use, 
which was already strictly regulated for mutual funds by various issuer-oriented rules (Gałkiewicz (2014)).   
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by U.S. funds in their reports were in line with actual CDS holdings positions. However, there were 
rarely concrete statements about a fund’s CDS related strategies. For example, funds pursuing short 
CDS strategies for non-hedging purposes often only stated to use long and short CDS for a wide range 
of purposes. By contrast, German funds seldom commented on their credit derivative holdings. The 
rare voluntary comments were of general nature and often even misleading. For instance, funds using 
more short CDS than long CDS often stated to use long CDS for hedging purposes only. An optimal 
regulation should prevent investors from reading unspecific information.  
My analysis reveals potential risks allowed by mutual fund regulation in the U.S. and Germany with 
respect to derivative transactions. In the U.S., the potential for realizing losses by selling CDS 
protection might become almost as high as a fund’s TNA, while in Germany, it is sometimes even 
higher. Furthermore, this high level of flexibility to use CDS allows funds to circumvent the existing 
strict direct leverage regulation. Finally, I show that the comments funds make about their CDS 
policies are vague and thus, investors have to analyze portfolio holdings in order to learn about their 
real investment behavior. This is of significant importance to regulators and investors alike. Since 
(mostly unsophisticated) investors all around the world expect a high level of protection from 
regulation, investment and disclosure strategies pursued by mutual funds should be intensively 
monitored by regulators and stronger regulation should be considered. 
A large body of literature focuses on the measurement and sources of mutual fund performance, 
which goes back to Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968). In the last two decades, this stream of literature 
was extended in the U.S. by the studies of Carhart (1997), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers 
(1997), Wermers (2000), Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), Ingersoll, Spiegel, Goetzmann, and 
Welch (2007), Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang (2008), Comer, Boney, and Kelly (2009), Chen, Ferson, 
and Peters (2010). Most prominent in Germany are the more recent studies of Kaserer and Pfau 
(1993), Scherer (1994), Kielkopf (1995), Steiner and Wittrock (1994), Reichling and Trautmann (1997), 
Griese and Kempf (2003), Stotz (2007), and Lehmann and Stehle (2013). Most of these studies show 
that, on average, mutual funds underperform the market. 
This study relates to the emerging literature on the purpose and the extent of derivative use by 
mutual and hedge funds (e.g., Koski and Pontiff (1999), Johnson and Yu (2004), Almazan, Brown, 
Carlson, and Chapman (2004), Marin and Rangel (2006), Chen (2011), Aragon and Martin (2012), Cici 
and Palacios (2013), and Adam and Guettler (2014)). These studies compare the performance and 
risk characteristics of funds using derivatives with those of nonusers. Most of the mutual fund studies 




funds using them. For example, lower fund performance of derivative users compared to nonusers is 
reported for Canadian domestic equity funds (Johnson and Yu (2004)), for several categories of 
Spanish funds (Marin and Rangel (2006)), and for U.S. equity mutual funds writing put options (Cici 
and Palacios (2013)). A few authors (Mahieu and Xu (2007), Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009), 
Hirtle (2009) and Van Ofwegen, Verschoor, and Zwinkels (2012)) have studied the use of CDS by 
banks. Mahieu and Xu (2007) and Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) presume that only a small 
fraction of loans are hedged by banks via CDS, while Van Ofwegen, Verschoor, and Zwinkels (2012) 
find higher insolvency risks at European financial institutions using credit derivatives. However, 
detailed information about the purpose of using derivatives is lacking as empirical observations and 
data availability are limited. This study contributes to this stream of literature by providing first 
evidence for the extent of CDS use by German corporate bond funds and analyzing the level of 
potential losses from CDS use for U.S. and German corporate bond funds. 
I also add to the extensive amount of literature on corporate and financial firm disclosure. The nature 
of corporate disclosure is summarized in Healy and Palepu (2001) and Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 
(2010).6 While much of the literature focuses on developing theoretical frameworks that explain 
observed patterns in corporate disclosure policies and providing tests for market efficiency 
hypotheses associated with the theory of asymmetric information, Healy and Palepu (2001) state that 
regulation may be necessary for reasons other than correcting an inefficient supply through the 
provision of information in a Pareto-optimal sense. Referring to studies by Leftwich (1980), Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) and Beaver (1998), Healy and Palepu (2001) note that the protection of individual 
“unsophisticated” investors may as well provide an explanation for prevailing regulation levels. 
Furthermore, Healy and Palepu (2001) argue that this reasoning shifts the normative grounds for 
regulation from an efficiency point of view to a wealth redistribution perspective. Indeed, there is 
evidence that regulators are far more concerned about the latter aspect than financial theory might 
be willing to acknowledge. Various SEC publications (e.g., SEC Staff report (1994), and SEC Letter to 
the GCotICI (2010)) provide evidence of the importance of the derivative strategies and disclosure 
policies of mutual funds, especially after times of crisis. My study therefore contributes to this less 
explored area of disclosure research. In particular, my paper is similar to the more recent empirical 
literature on risk disclosure of public companies (e.g., Hodder, Koonce, and McAnally (2001), Kajueter 
and Winkler (2003), Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Lajili and Zeghal (2005), Linsley and Shrives (2006), 
CFA Report (2011), and CFA Report (2013)), insurance companies (e.g., Hoering and Gruendl (2011), 
and Malafronte, Porzio, and Starita (2013)), and banks (e.g., Hodder (2002), Linsley and Shrives 
6
 This stream of literature goes back to the seminal contributions of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984), who emphasize the role of asymmetric information in a corporate finance context. 
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(2005), Perignon and Smith (2008), and Schlueter, Hartmann-Wendels, Weber, and Zander (2013)). 
This study shows that deficiencies in disclosure, which are observable for public companies and 
financial institutions, are also observable for U.S. and German corporate bond funds. To the best of 
my knowledge, there are no studies that analyze the investment and reporting behavior of German 
funds with regard to CDS use.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses CDS related strategies. Section 3 
presents the objectives of the study based on U.S and German regulation of mutual fund leverage 
and derivative holdings. Section 4 presents the data and section 5 analyzes the CDS use and the 
information funds provide to investors about their CDS policies. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
2 CDS Related Strategies 
CDS are the main form of credit derivatives and can be viewed as default insurance on loans or bonds 
(Duffie (1999)). For protection, a buyer (seller) pays (receives) a premium until the time of the credit 
event, or the maturity date of the contract (whichever is first). If a defined credit event occurs, the 
buyer receives the insured notional amount of a bond from the seller (after subtracting the recovery 
value of the bond); if a triggering event does not take place, the buyer pays the premium until 
maturity. Due to the fact that selling CDS protection generates high implicit leverage (at low 
premiums), it is suitable to implement risky investment strategies, which might lead to significant 
losses. Funds buy and sell various types of CDS that can be classified as single-name CDS (CDS on 
individual corporate or sovereign bonds), and multi-name CDS (CDS indices, CDS on bond indices and 
asset-backed securities). Depending on the constellation, the following CDS strategies are classified 
either as hedging or investment strategies predetermined to gain additional exposure to credit risk.7 
In the case of bought CDS (protection buyer, long position), one can distinguish between at least four 
strategies: First, buying CDS on a specific underlying bond without having the underlying bond in the 
portfolio (naked long CDS) is probably a bet on the deterioration of the creditworthiness of a 
company. This strategy is speculative in nature and exposes the fund to counterparty risk. Second, 
buying CDS on an underlying in a portfolio is probably a way to hedge against a value loss of the bond 
caused by its deteriorating credit quality.8 Third, simultaneously buying a bond and CDS on the 
respective bond can be perceived as a way to exploit temporary spread differences in the CDS market 
and the bond market, which are due to mispricing or differing counterparty and liquidity risks. Buying 
7
 See Adam und Guettler (2014). 
8
 Buying CDS on an underlying position that is highly correlated with a bond in the portfolio would be an additional way to 
hedge against a value loss of the bond, while a high volatility in bought CDS positions could imply speculative strategies. 
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CDS at a lower spread than implied by the bond spread (CDS basis = CDS spread – bond spread) and 
assuming no default of the counterparty, would be a so-called “negative basis trade” or a way to 
realize arbitrage gains.9 Fourth, buying CDS at low levels and selling them at high levels of credit risk 
premia (credit market timing) is a way to exploit interest rate changes over time.10 In the case of 
corporate bond funds, one could have bought CDS before the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 and sold 
them during the crisis for a gain. Alternatively, funds can buy or sell CDS to offset previously sold or 
bought CDS positions on exactly the same securities (with the same notional amount, coupon, and 
maturity) to close existing positions.   
For the case of sold CDS (protection seller, short position), two additional strategies should be 
mentioned: First, selling CDS and investing the notional amount into Treasuries would synthesize a 
bond or index, e.g., to diversify the portfolio. Additionally, this investment strategy could be the only 
way, or a cheaper way, to acquire a specific bond depending on market conditions.11 Second, a 
levered bond position is created by selling CDS without increasing Treasuries, which is significantly 
riskier than a regular, unlevered bond position (in addition to its total net assets, the fund is subject 
to investment exposure on the notional amount of the swaps). If the CDS underlying positions are 
different from the other holdings, gaining additional exposure could help diversify the portfolio. 
Nevertheless, this strategy is speculative in nature. 
It is not possible to distinguish between the above mentioned CDS strategies in detail because 
aggregate CDS positions are examined without analyzing the CDS underlying positions and without 
matching them to the portfolio positions of individual funds. However, based on aggregate long and 
short CDS data at the fund level, it is possible to estimate whether CDS were largely used for hedging 
or for gaining exposure (e.g., Adam and Guettler (2014)). In the following, I distinguish between long 
and short CDS strategies applied for hedging or for non-hedging purposes whenever possible. 
3 Mutual Fund Leverage and Derivative Regulation and the Objectives of the 
Study 
According to Gałkiewicz (2014), funds in both countries can keep derivatives with a notional amount 
higher than the value of a fund’s net assets. Thus, depending on the types of derivatives used, funds 
9
 See Oehmke and Zawadowski (2013) and “Get Positive Results With Negative Basis Trades” 
 [http://www.investopedia.com/articles/trading/08/negative-basis-trades.asp#axzz2Io8W8UVf, visited on 15.12.2012]. 
10
 See Adam und Guettler (2014). 
11
 It could also be a way to bypass issuer oriented rules in the U.S. that, like the diversification rule, restrict a fund’s 
investments into securities of one issuer to 5% of a fund’s TNA. Bonds and CDS would usually be accounted for at market 
values under this rule, with the latter having a much smaller value, while having the same characteristics when used in 
combination with Treasury securities to synthesize bonds. See SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011). 
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in both countries can reach the point at which the default is theoretically possible solely due to their 
investments into derivatives, e.g., by investing into short CDS with a notional amount equal to (and in 
Germany/the EU, even higher than) the value of a fund’s net assets. For example, funds could sell CDS 
protection written on, e.g., asset-backed securities (ABS), with a notional amount equal to the 
amount of their net assets (the other investments of a fund are ignored for the moment). If the 
underlying positions come under economic pressure (as was the case during the last financial crisis), 
bond funds will be required to pay the notional amount (minus any recovery values of the underlying 
positions of the CDS) to their contract counterparties. Thus, depending on the engagement of funds 
in short CDS as measured by the notional amount and on the size of the recovery values, unfortunate 
circumstances could destroy a large part, or even the entire value of the fund (Gałkiewicz (2014)).  
In particular, the U.S. and German/EU regulatory frameworks differ in how they regulate the use of 
derivatives and leverage by funds. In the U.S., bank borrowing is restricted to 33% of a fund’s net 
assets, while in Germany it is restricted to 10% of a fund’s net assets, which is the only form of direct 
leverage available to them. However, they can implicitly create a similar effect to explicit borrowing 
(direct leverage) by investing into derivatives or engaging into securities-lending transactions12 
(indirect leverage). For example, a fund can create implicit leverage equal to the notional amount13 by 
selling protection via CDS (short position), which is comparable to borrowing the notional amount 
from a bank and investing it in the principal of a bond. Funds that build high positions in derivatives 
could create extensive leverage that eventually lead to liquidity problems and drive them into default. 
Thus, independent from the limits on direct leverage, U.S. and German funds face limits on derivative 
use. In the U.S., funds, in general, have to earmark portfolio securities or keep offsetting positions as 
collateral for all potential obligations to a third party created in their portfolio by securities-lending 
transactions and derivatives. These include e.g., futures, forwards, written options, and short CDS. 
Theoretically, under U.S. regulation a fund could, at most, sell protection via CDS with a notional 
amount equal to the value of its net assets and earmark all its portfolio securities as collateral. In 
Germany/the EU, the potential market risk of a fund, in general, can be doubled by derivative use (as 
measured by the Value-at-Risk determined at 99% confidence level).14 Similarly, a fund might sell CDS 
protection with a notional amount equal to (or even higher than) the value of its net assets as long as 
its VaR is less than twice as high as a VaR of a comparable fund without derivatives.15 Thus, by using 
12
 E.g., if a fund enters into a repurchase agreement it hands over some of its securities to the counterparty of the 
transaction and gets instead cash, which is comparable to a collateralized loan.  
13
 For derivatives, the notional amount usually reflects the scale of a position with reference to some underlying asset and 
shows the volume traded during a period of time (McDonald (2009)). 
14
 The U.S. approach would be comparable to determining the potential 100%-portfolio loss via VaR. See Gałkiewicz (2014). 
15
 Since mid-2011, in addition to the relative VaR, an “absolute” VaR can be calculated (at the 99% confidence level for a 20-
(previously 10)-business-day holding period using parameters from previous year). The new VaR measure is subject to an 
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derivatives, such as short CDS, a fund can create additional leverage in order to circumvent the more 
strict restrictions on direct leverage. However, once a credit event specified under the CDS contract 
happens, funds are required to pay the notional amount to the counterparty and receive the 
defaulted bond (or the amount decreased by the cash equivalent of a bond’s recovery value); 
therefore, they might become illiquid due to extensive leverage. As a consequence of the flexibility 
provided by regulation, it is possible for funds in both countries to lose a large part of their value due 
to investments in derivatives, such as CDS, alone.16 The new regulation decided on in 2009 at the G-
20 member states meeting in Pittsburgh does not address these issues as it mainly focuses on 
restricting the potential for counterparty risk to arise through derivative use. In fact, this kind of 
exposure was already strictly regulated for mutual funds by various issuer-oriented rules (Gałkiewicz 
(2014)). 
Given this hypothetical flexibility, I investigate whether the largest funds in both countries, which 
have the highest number of investors, expose themselves to potentially high losses via selling CDS 
protection. 
Furthermore, after crises that are related to derivative use, regulators usually prefer to tighten 
disclosure rules in order to protect investors instead of restricting derivative use directly (e.g., SEC 
Staff report (1994), CFA Report (2011), and CFA Report (2013)). Against this background, the 
subsequent analyses might give insight into how effective this kind of protection is when CDS and 
corporate bond funds are considered. According to the Investment Company Act (ICA) of 1940, U.S. 
funds are required to inform investors about derivative use in statements of incorporation (Form N-
1A), prospectuses, Statements of Additional Information (SAIs), and periodic reports.17 The statement 
of incorporation contains information about a fund’s intention to use derivatives, while the 
prospectus comprises information about a fund’s current use of derivatives (or alternatively, its 
intention to use derivatives). The SAI includes general detailed descriptions of a fund’s (or a fund 
family’s) derivatives handling (by type), while the report comments describe the derivative strategies 
applied by a fund together with a brief derivative handling (by type). By contrast, German funds are 
only required to inform investors about potential derivative use in the terms of the contract 
contained in the extended prospectuses. However, comments on derivative use in the terms of the 
“absolute” limit of 20% of the value of the fund. Since mid-2011, UCITS funds also have to hold sufficient liquid funds for 
cash settled derivatives and the underlying position or sufficient liquid funds for physically settled derivatives (if the 
underlying asset is highly liquid and can be purchased on the market at any time). However, the exact amount is up to 
discretion. 
16
 For the information contained in this paragraph, refer to Gałkiewicz (2014), CIL/KAGB [2013], Derivative Order/DerivateV 
(2011), CESR Guidelines (2010), SEC Concept Release on Derivatives (2011), ICA (1940), SEC Release 10666 (1979). 
17
 Funds in the U.S. often face specific internal restrictions on derivative use as suggested for equity funds by Almazan, 
Brown, Carlson, and Chapman (2004).  
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contract largely follow the general wording of the law. Additional simplified prospectuses issued to 
the public in the EU provide general information about a fund’s investment strategy without explicitly 
referring to derivatives; since mid-2011, they are known as the more standardized Key Investor 
Information Documents (KIIDs).18 Compared to the U.S., the public reports of German funds contain 
only a brief description of a fund’s investment strategy during a specific period (including voluntary 
comments on derivative strategies applied by a fund). Moreover, all CDS policies pursued by funds in 
both countries should be in line with their type and investment strategy as stated in the prospectuses 
(and also statements of incorporation in the U.S. or the terms of contract in Germany/the EU). 
Given that the disclosures of U.S. funds are more extensive than those of German funds, I analyze 
whether the descriptions contained in the annual and semi-annual fund reports were consistent with 
the disclosed CDS holdings. In particular, I investigate whether the comments funds make about their 
CDS policies allow readers of the reports to assess the extent CDS are used for hedging, speculation, 
or non-speculative purposes (e.g., replicating securities).  
An empirical analysis of the level of CDS use and of the disclosures by funds allows this study to 
assess whether prevalent restrictions on derivative use are protecting investors from potentially 
significant losses and the accuracy of information funds provided to investors about their derivative 
policies. This might reveal a need to modify existing regulation in order to better protect investors – 
many of whom might not be aware about the possibility of a fund losing a large share of its portfolio 
due to derivative holdings. 
4 Data 
4.1 Data Description 
In order to investigate CDS holdings and disclosures, the analysis focuses on semi-annual and annual 
reports of the largest U.S. and German corporate bond funds19 from 01.07.2004 to 31.12.2010 (13 
periods). The sample period starts in 2004 because prior to 2004, German funds were not allowed to 
use CDS and since 2004, U.S. mutual funds are required to disclose their portfolio holdings (with 
derivatives) on a quarterly basis. However, since German bond funds only report semi-annually, I only 
consider the U.S. semi-annual and annual reports, which provide investors with the most 
18
 In addition, since 2011, the German regulator BaFin requires mutual funds to report their derivative strategies separately 
from the public reports and directly to the BaFin (Derivative Order/DerivateV (2011)). See Gałkiewicz (2014). 
19
 The term “German funds” refers to funds distributed to investors in Germany. However, some of the sample funds are 
legally incorporated in Luxemburg where the new regulation was implemented in 2002 (and took full effect in 2004). 
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comprehensive explanations of a fund’s investment strategy. The U.S. reports are either downloaded 
directly from the SEC webpage or via the EDGARpro database, while German reports are directly 
provided by the investment companies upon request. In addition, I analyze some prospectuses and 
Statements of Additional Information (SAI). To determine the sample of funds, I follow Adam and 
Guettler (2014) by excluding money market funds, treasury funds, municipal funds, mortgage funds, 
index funds, and fund reports after a merger occurred20 from the sample. The U.S. funds belong to 
the following Lipper fund classes: corporate debt funds A-rated, corporate debt funds BBB-rated, 
short investment grade, short-intermediate investment grade, intermediate investment grade, multi-
sector income, and high current yield funds. For the results to be interesting for a wide group of 
investors and comparable to previous research, the study analyzes the 30 largest corporate bond 
funds, as determined by TNA, that are included in the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free U.S. Mutual Fund 
Database as of the end of the second quarter of 2004.21 This results in a total of 389 reports. 
Table 1 contains the names of the top 30 U.S. corporate bond funds as of the second quarter of 2004 
and their respective TNA. The largest fund in the sample is the Total Return Fund of the PIMCO fund 
family with a TNA of $73 billion, while the smallest fund in the sample is the Sanford C. Bernstein 
Fund’s Intermediate Duration Portfolio with a TNA of $2.7 billion. The study includes periods in which 
U.S. funds use CDS, thus, the final sample contains 192 reports. 
Bond funds distributed in Germany are grouped based on the BVI-Classification22: fixed income funds 
investing mainly in Euro; fixed income funds investing mainly in German issuers (both may be 
combined with the sub-classes of short-term bond funds, middle-term bond funds, and long-term 
bond funds); fixed income funds with variable investments; and fixed income funds, corporate bonds. 
The German sample is restricted to funds that mainly hold investments in the Euro-Area (U.S. funds 
focus on U.S. investments). Additionally, fixed maturity funds and funds only invested in money 
market instruments and government securities are removed to make the sample as comparable as 
possible to the U.S. sample. Some reports are missing, but they are expected to only have a minor 
impact on data quality since most of the funds don’t hold CDS around the missing dates.23 
20
 The Evergreen Core Bond Fund merged with another funds in July 2010. Thus, the last report is not considered. 
21
 An exact matching of the sample starting date was not possible due to data constraints. Thus, U.S. funds are classified as 
of June 30, 2004, while German funds as of December 31, 2004. 
22
 See BVI Classification [http://www.bvi.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Statistik/BVI_Abkürzungsverzeichnis.pdf, visited on 
24.01.2013], p. 1, 11, 16. The BVI was set up in the year 1970 as “Bundesverband Deutscher Investment-Gesellschaften“ 
(German Federal Association of Investment Companies) and is currently known (since 2005) under the name 
“Bundesverband Investment und Asset Management e.V.“ (German Federal Association of Investment and Asset 
Management). All companies represented in Germany, except some small or foreign companies, are members; 99% of 
overall funds’ TNA is represented by this association. See BVI Jahresbericht 2008, p. 18. According to Lehmann and Stehle 
(2013) 90% to 95% of all investment funds distributed in Germany are captured by this database. 
23
 Two funds only report annually (top30de, No. 20, 25). Additionally, one report is missing for 2010 for fund No. 25 
(however, the fund does not use CDS before 2010). Moreover, three reports are missing for fund No. 14 (for the 31.03.2006, 
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Additionally, some prospectuses (the simplified one and the comprehensive one) and terms of 
contract are analyzed. Since the reports of Allianz PIMCO Euro Bond Total Return Fund (that would be 
ranked by TNA as place 16) are not available, I include the next fund, resulting in a total of 361 
reports from the 30 largest German bond funds. In general, the reports of funds distributed to the 
German public should be accessible via the “Online Bundesanzeiger”, but unfortunately only a few 
reports can be found on this webpage. Since the study focuses only on German funds using CDS (at 
period end or within period), the final sample contains 114 reports. End-of-period CDS holdings are 
provided in 106 of the reports, and the cumulated amounts of CDS turned over within the period are 
given for an additional 49 of them. Furthermore, the amount of CDS turned over within the half-years 
are reported for 8 cases without showing any CDS positions at the end of the period. In the 192 U.S. 
and 114 German fund reports, I search for details regarding CDS positions (i.e., CDS notional amounts 
of bought and sold positions, market values of CDS and a fund’s TNA) in the schedule of portfolio 
holdings. For the purposes of this study, I aggregate positions at the fund-quarter level and convert 
Euro amounts into U.S. dollar using the exchange rate for the respective reporting date. 
Table 2 presents the 30 largest funds (as measured by a fund’s TNA at the end of 2004 in the BVI 
database) distributed in Germany (from now on referred to as German funds). The largest German 
fund in the sample is the dit-Euro Bond Total Return of the Allianz Global Luxemburg fund family with 
a TNA of $6.3 billion. The smallest fund is the Deka-CorporateBond Euro with a TNA of $0.591 billion. 
As seen in Table 1 and 2, the 30 largest U.S. and 30 largest German funds significantly differ in terms 
of size. All U.S. funds are at least four times larger than their German counterparts. This might have 
an effect on the size of the derivative holdings, which is expected to be higher for larger funds due to 
cost saving arguments (Koski and Pontiff (1999)). 
4.2 Variable Definition 
In order to perform the analyses specified in section 3, two proxies are determined to gain insight 
into the lowest and highest potential fund loss due to CDS (i.e., for the case that all short CDS are 
triggered and the recovery value of the underlying positions is equal to zero24): the notional amount 
from CDS short positions and the CDS net notional amount. This potential fund loss shows what a 
31.03.2009, 31.03.2010; however, the fund does not use CDS before 2007). Furthermore, two reports are missing for 2007 
for fund No. 10 (however, the fund does not use CDS before 2010), and two reports are missing for fund No. 15 (for the 
31.03.2009 and 31.03.2010, however, this fund does not use CDS around those dates). The following funds merged with 
another funds, thus, as in Adam and Guettler (2014), reports after the merge dates are not considered (top30de, No. 3 on 
19.03.2010, No. 12 on 23.04.2010, No. 22 on 09.04.2010, No. 23 on 16.04.2010, No. 24 on 31.03.2008). 
24
 In reality, these potential obligations would be partially offset by any recovery values of the referenced debt obligation. 
However, this assumption is made following U.S. regulation. 
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fund can lose in addition to the potential 100% of TNA loss it can suffer from other portfolio 
investments. 
The size of the CDS net notional amount (CDS net notional) and notional amount from short CDS 
positions (short CDS positions) are good approximations for determining the size of potential future 
obligations arising out of CDS use by funds. According to U.S. regulation, short CDS positions reflect 
the highest level of potential future obligations (future undiscounted payments) a fund must cover. In 
the absence of long CDS, and if short CDS are used for speculation only, the potential future 
obligations from CDS indicate the highest possible fund losses over and above its potential losses 
from other portfolio securities. Additionally, CDS net notional is used, which is a more conservative 
measure of potential obligations and assumes a fund’s long and short CDS positions offset each other. 
However, it should be noted that the sample funds seldom hold long and short CDS positions on 
exactly the same securities to cancel existing positions in terms of notional amount, coupon, and 
maturity. Regarding leverage regulation, long CDS reflect, in general, negative leverage because a 
using long CDS is equivalent to shorting a bond and investing the notional value of the CDS into 
Treasury securities. Thus, this proxy also reflects the amount of indirect leverage a fund keeps. The 
size and direction of the CDS net notional allows an estimation about whether CDS were largely used 
for hedging (+) or for gaining exposure (-), as suggested by Adam and Guettler (2014). When 
construing these measures of potential fund obligations, it is implicitly assumed that all short CDS 
underlying positions could simultaneously fall under economic pressure even if they comprise CDS 
written on various single- and multi-name references. To some extent, this was the case during the 
2007-2009 financial crisis. 
5 Results 
First, I investigate the level of CDS use and the potential for realizing losses via CDS for U.S. and 
German corporate bond funds under current regulation. Second, based on period-end and within-
period CDS data, which are only available for German funds, I investigate to which extent the former 
are representative of a fund’s investment behavior within the period. Third, I analyze the information 
funds provide to investors about their CDS policies in both countries. 
5.1 CDS Use and Potential to Realize Losses via CDS in the U.S. and Germany 
CDS were held by 19 out of the 30 sample U.S. funds in 192 half-years between the end of 2004 and 




indicated by period-end data. Additionally, 13 German funds list the amount of cumulated CDS 
notionals sold within the period in 57 half-years in their reports. In the U.S., the number of CDS users 
increased from 11 in the second half of 2004 to 17 funds in the second half of 2007, and then 
decreased to 13 funds in 2010. Likewise, the number of CDS users in Germany increased from 1 in the 
second half of 2004 to 15 funds in the second half of 2007 and first half of 2008 before it started to 
vary between 9 and 13 funds after 2008 (Figure 1). Funds in both countries usually held many CDS 
contracts, which were partly written on single-name corporate (and seldom sovereign) references 
and partly on multi-name indices such as iTraxx or CDX. As shown in Table 3 and 4, the sum of all CDS 
positions (long and short CDS) held by U.S. funds over the entire sample period was on average 7.84% 
of TNA ($1,181 mio.), compared to 17.33% of TNA ($175 mio.) in Germany.25 The largest CDS 
positions within the observation period were held by the U.S. Fidelity Short-Term Bond Fund 
(129.09% of TNA or $33,778 mio.) and Deka-CorporateBond Euro (160.89% of TNA or $592 mio.).26 
Figure 2 shows that the total size of the CDS positions increased from an average of 2.28% in 2004 to 
4.58% of TNA in 2010 for U.S. funds and from 1.56% to 9.65% for German funds during the same time 
period. At the beginning of 2007, after the new EU-wide regulation was fully implemented by the 
funds registered in Germany, CDS positions increased significantly. Especially after the initiation of 
CDS use, the average percentage observable for German funds was higher than for U.S. funds. Given 
the fact that German funds did not have prior experience using CDS, this trend is surprising. While 
U.S. funds reduced their overall CDS positions after the height of the crisis in the second half of 2008, 
German funds continued to hold substantial CDS positions until mid-2009. 
Figure 3 distinguishes between long CDS (protection bought) and short CDS (protection sold) 
positions as related to a fund’s TNA. German funds maintained significantly larger CDS long and short 
positions than U.S. funds, except in the second half of 2008 where U.S. funds had larger short CDS 
positions. While U.S. funds started to successively reduce their CDS positions, German funds began to 
build significant short positions again in 2010. Additionally, U.S. funds also reduced long positions 
after 2007 and 2008 when credit risk premia were the highest, while German funds first increased 
their long CDS positions before reducing them in 2010. Figure 4 graphs the CDS net positions (long – 
short) over time, measuring the fund’s net exposure to credit risk compared to the credit risk 
premium (measured by the yield difference between BBB-rated debt and Treasury securities). The 
25
 I report the mean values of CDS for the sample of funds that used CDS, which changes over the selected time period. The 
mean and median values as presented in Figures 2 to 4 often differ by a large amount, which is due to outliers. Thus, some 
average figures overemphasize trends in general CDS use. However, for the purposes of this study, it is more important to 
estimate what is potentially possible under current regulation, i.e., the results obtained for the extreme cases are of large 
importance. The analysis of extreme cases shows the shortcomings of mutual fund regulation and a potential lack of 
protection for corporate bond fund investors. 
26
 These percentages reflect the potential leverage from CDS defined under EU law as the sum of CDS notional amounts 
(CESR Guidelines (2010)). 
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CDS net position for both countries were persistently negative, with the exception of German funds in 
the second half of 2009. Overall, there were no significant differences between the average net 
strategies pursued by funds in both countries (Table 5), which were net short until the end of 2008 
when the credit risk premium rose significantly. Hence, in the worst case scenario, if funds used short 
CDS as a speculative tool (and not for synthesizing bonds) during the financial crisis, this strategy 
could have led to substantial losses due to the large increase in credit risk premia during this time 
(see Figure 4).27 The above results are in line with those of Adam and Guettler (2014) who find that 
U.S. corporate bond funds are net sellers of CDS, implying that managers, on average, do not use CDS 
to hedge credit risk.28  
One cannot determine the effect changes in CDS use have on a fund’s risk and performance profile 
without taking into account parallel changes in asset allocation or changes in the overall investment 
strategy of a fund.29 However, the market (fair) value of CDS (unrealized depreciation/appreciation) 
shows how much a fund’s TNA was negatively/positively affected by CDS contracts at a specific 
reporting date. This accounting value is more than ten times smaller than the CDS notional amount. 
As shown in Table 4, the average unrealized value for U.S. funds equaled -0.25% of TNA with the 
highest value of -8.10% of TNA observable in the second half of 2008. The values are lower for 
German funds: The average unrealized value equaled -0.10% of TNA with the highest value of -1.63% 
of TNA observable in the first half of 2009. Given the average return of 0.54% for U.S. corporate bond 
funds between 2004 and 2010 (Adam and Guettler (2014)), the highest and average unrealized losses 
in fund value due to CDS observable at reporting date were substantial for both countries. 
Although definite conclusions about speculation require access to the portfolio holdings of funds, the 
current data on CDS allow the analysis of the potential for realizing losses via CDS beyond the 
potential 100% of TNA loss the fund can suffer from other portfolio investments. As Table 4 shows, 
the mean (median) short CDS positions of U.S. funds equaled 5.47% (2.03%) of TNA for the entire 
sample period. Figure 3 shows that short CDS positions increased over time from an average of 1.46% 
of TNA in 2004 to 3.68% in 2010, with a peak of 15.14% in the second half of 2008. As shown in Table 
6, the largest short CDS positions of the top30us funds no. 14 and 24 reached 93.82% and 61.66% of 
27
 In 2009, when the credit risk premia were falling, German funds went net long. From the perspective of a speculative 
strategy (market timing), it would have been better to stay net short during this time. The net short exposure of German 
funds increased only in 2010, which might have been a beneficial speculative strategy because of falling credit risk premia. 
In 2009 and 2010, U.S. funds successively reduced their CDS holdings while keeping an almost constant net exposure to 
credit risk. From the perspective of a speculative strategy, they might have benefitted from staying net short during this 
time, but not necessarily from the reductions. 
28
 The authors further show that U.S. funds pursuing net short CDS strategies during the crisis had alphas, which were 51-80 
basis points lower per month than these of funds that were net long. 
29
 Recent research provides evidence that sold CDS are mostly perceived as a risk increasing tool: For example, Van 
Ofwegen, Verschoor, and Zwinkels (2012) give evidence that banks sell CDS to increase their risk exposure. 
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TNA, respectively, indicating that if CDS were used for speculative purposes only (not for synthesizing 
bonds in combination with Treasury securities), potential additional losses from short CDS exposure 
could have been as high as 93.82% and 61.66% of TNA for these two funds. However, the majority of 
U.S. funds held moderate short CDS positions that did not exceed 15% of their TNA and did not lead 
to negative net CDS positions higher than 15% of their TNA. For U.S. funds, the mean (median) CDS 
net notional equaled -3.10% (-1.32%) of TNA for the entire sample period (Table 4). The average 
negative CDS net notional increased over time with a remarkable peak of -9.89% in the second half of 
2008 and was persistently negative, which indicates that U.S. funds took on more risk than they 
hedged (see Figure 4). As shown in Table 6, for most of the U.S. funds the CDS net notional ranged 
from ca. 12% to -15% of TNA. However, for two funds (top30us no. 14 and 24) the negative net 
notional (and indirect leverage) reached a value of 58.54% and 54.46%, respectively. By looking into 
the periodic reports, one can observe that these funds were highly diversified (one of them included 
“diversified”30 into its name to attract investors with this feature) and that it might have been 
beneficial for them to use many short CDS for synthesizing bonds or indices. Indeed, discussions with 
practitioners confirm that many funds kept higher cash positions in their portfolios (especially those 
facing higher outflows) during the crisis and used short CDS to increase their exposure to individual 
names and the market. Nevertheless, if CDS were used by these two funds only for speculative 
purposes, losses from CDS net exposure could have been as high as 58.54% and 54.46% of TNA. 
As Table 4 shows, the mean (median) short CDS positions of German funds equaled 10.91% (5.09%) 
of TNA for the entire sample period. Figure 3 shows that the average short CDS position increased 
over time with a peak of 20.95% in the first half of 2008. As opposed to U.S. funds, several other 
German funds presented in Table 7 (top30de no. 1, 8, 12, and 14) sometimes kept a relatively high 
amount of short CDS, ca. 40% of TNA, which led to negative net positions in CDS (and indirect 
leverage) of around 30% of TNA at reporting date. Again, since these funds are generally required by 
law to be highly diversified (CESR Guidelines (2010)), it might have been beneficial for them to use 
many short CDS for synthesizing bonds or indices. However, if CDS were used only for speculative 
purposes, a German fund’s loss from short CDS exposure could have been up to 127.04% of TNA – 
1.35 times higher than for an individual U.S. fund. The largest short CDS position of 127.04% of TNA 
of top30de fund no. 30 occurred in the first half of 2008. For German funds, the mean (median) CDS 
net notional equaled -4.48% (-1.46%) of TNA for the entire sample period (Table 4). The average 
negative CDS net notional increased over time with a peak of -12.94% in the first half of 2008 (Figure 
4). As shown in Table 5, there were significant differences in CDS use between U.S. and German 
30
 U.S. funds are generally required by law to be diversified with regard to security issuers (SEC Concept Release on 
Derivatives (2011)).  
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funds, except for the net exposure from CDS. However, these differences might be partially driven by 
the first occurrence of higher CDS amounts at German funds during the time of the crisis when the 
size of the CDS market peaked. The CDS net notional ranged from 21.22% to -93.19% of TNA with the 
largest negative net notional (top30de fund no. 30) being 1.6 times higher than for individual U.S. 
funds. Thus, if CDS were only used for speculative purposes (not for synthesizing bonds), a German 
fund’s loss from CDS net exposure could have been as high as 93.19% of TNA (vs. 58.54% of TNA for 
an individual U.S. fund). 
Figure 5 and 6 compare the Deka-CorporateBond Euro Fund’s (top 30de fund no. 30) and the Putnam 
Diversified Income Trust’s (top30us fund no. 14) CDS long and short positions together with their 
half-year returns between 2004 and 2010. These funds used large amounts of short CDS (127.04% 
and 93.82% of TNA, respectively) in the middle of the crisis and decreased the amounts shortly 
afterwards. Although the levels of indirect leverage of 93.19% and 58.54% of TNA, respectively, 
created this way were in line with existing regulation, one can only speculate why these funds used 
such high levels of CDS. From a credit market timing perspective, increasing short CDS positions until 
the middle (Deka-CorporateBond Euro) and the end (Putnam Diversified Income Trust) of the crisis 
such that they surpassed multiple times the size of long CDS at times when the level of credit risk 
premia was increasing (Table 4),  possibly led to losses (Adam and Guettler (2014)). A large part of the 
short CDS could have been used to increase the riskiness of the fund (and its potential to gain or lose) 
above the usual level as well.31 In the second half of 2008, DekaCorporate Bond Euro Fund rapidly 
decreased its short CDS and kept positions of less than 5% of its TNA in short CDS once performance 
recovered. A similar pattern is observable for Putnam Diversified Income Trust. Its short CDS peaked 
in the second half of 2008 and gradually decreased in 2009 to less than 5% of its TNA once 
performance recovered. This indicates that this U.S. fund might have sold CDS protection primarily to 
synthesize regular bonds and to add risk. This is evidence that funds are able to circumvent direct 
leverage restrictions, which limit bank borrowing to 10% and 33.3% of a fund’s TNA in Germany/the 
EU and the U.S., respectively. Funds in both countries can inflate overall leverage by using derivatives, 
such as CDS, to levels that lie above the value of funds’ net assets. This high level of flexibility was not 
originally envisaged by regulators and might not be in the best interest of investors.   
The above findings show that the potential realizable losses from CDS might be higher than a fund’s 
net assets in Germany, while in the U.S., they might be almost as high as a fund’s TNA. The case of the 
31
 Funds might also have entered into short CDS to earn the premium on sold insurance in order to hide their bad 
performance around the crisis. However, because of rising credit risk premia, the unrealized loss from short CDS at that time 
would possibly negatively affect the value of a fund’s net assets. Long CDS entered into by a fund in the pre-crisis period 
could have, if not cancelled before, positively impacted the value of a fund’s net assets during the crisis.  
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Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund, which lost 80% of TNA largely due to CDS use, shows that 
potential loss from derivatives can materialize. Thus, irrespective of how unlikely it is that all CDS 
underlying positions fall under economic pressure simultaneously, it might be worthwhile to 
reconsider the flexibility funds have under current regulation. To better protect unsophisticated 
investors from potentially significant losses due to derivative transactions, the potential future 
obligations from derivatives used for speculation could be restricted to a reasonable level below a 
fund’s TNA, as suggested by Gałkiewicz (2014). Based on the empirical results, one can see that 
stronger restrictions on the use of the CDS would not affect the majority of U.S. or German funds. 
Stronger restrictions would rather benefit the mutual fund industry as a whole because they could 
prevent potentially high, and long-lasting, losses due to outliers.  
Furthermore, the observed cross- and within-country variations in CDS use might be the outcome of 
different regulatory regimes and/or fund characteristics, such as membership in a fund family, size, 
age, expense ratio, turnover ratio, investment style, management structure, and manager 
characteristics. For example, Koski and Pontiff (1999), Johnson and Yu (2004), and Marin and Rangel 
(2006) find that the use of derivatives is correlated with fund related variables, such as size, age, asset 
turnover and membership in a fund family for a sample of U.S., Canadian, and Spanish mutual funds, 
respectively. Further research should shed light on the within-country variations and relate them to 
cross-country variations.32 The trends in CDS use are in line with the findings of Adam and Guettler 
(2014). I contribute to this literature by providing insights into the investment behavior of German 
funds with regard to CDS and by analyzing the level of potential losses and indirect leverage of U.S. 
and German corporate bond funds due to CDS use. 
5.2 Representativeness of CDS holdings of German Funds Reported at Period End 
One of the main disadvantages of using semi-annual CDS holdings data is that round-trip trades 
occurring within half of a year (i.e., the purchase and sale of CDS – or the other way around – that 
take place between two consecutive reporting dates) are missed. However, gains and losses 
generated by CDS holdings within the reporting period could have already affected the fund’s TNA via 
the realized gains and losses position. In this case, German data, which specify the level of fund 
activity within the reporting period, provide additional insights compared to U.S. data. The German 
reports comprise an initial and second schedule of portfolio holdings; the second schedule shows all 
32
 Adam and Guettler (2014) compare the risk and return profiles of U.S. funds using CDS with those of nonusers around and 
during the financial crisis, while controlling for various fund characteristics. Although beyond the scope of this paper, 
determining the risk and return profiles of German funds using CDS (at period end and within period) and comparing them 
to U.S. results could provide new insights about the investment strategies of funds. 
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transactions closed within the reporting period, including the cumulated CDS sales (reflected by the 
sum of long and short CDS notional and often by the individual long and short CDS).33 Analyzing how 
active funds are in trading CDS within a half-year helps clarify to which extent end-of-period CDS 
holdings are representative of a fund’s investment behavior within the period. 
In order to approximate CDS turnover and examine the number of missed trades, I focus on a 
subsample of 13 German funds that report cumulated within-period sales of CDS in 57 periods.34 The 
aggregate sales of CDS capture the decrease in CDS holdings between the past and present reporting 
dates (i.e., sales of CDS) and within-period CDS trades where purchases are followed by sales. 
However, one erroneous observation35 is deleted. Thus, for the final sample consisting of 56 
observations, I define an approximated (volume based) CDS turnover ratio and, because turnover 
ratio data are not available for German funds, a variable showing missing trades. Figure 1 shows that 
the number of German funds reporting within-period CDS increased from 1 in 2005 to 8 at the end of 
2007 before it started to vary between 5 and 8 funds afterwards. This corresponds to the 
development of the number of funds reporting the use of CDS at period-end, suggesting that some 
funds repeatedly used CDS in the second half of the calendar year. 
Following the common definition of the fund turnover ratio36, an approximated CDS turnover ratio is 
constructed as the ratio of the minimum of aggregate sales or aggregate purchases of CDS (measured 
by the notional) and the average of present and past end-of-period CDS notional of a fund. In order 
to determine the approximated CDS turnover, I first calculate the aggregate purchases of CDS of a 
fund by adding the aggregate sales of CDS to the difference in CDS notional between present and 
past reporting date.37 The final approximated CDS turnover ratio reflects the minimum of aggregate 
sales or aggregate purchases of CDS of a fund scaled by its average CDS notional (the CDS turnover is 
missing for five observations because the average CDS notional is zero). Lastly, I create a variable 
showing the missing trades in percentage of aggregate CDS by subtracting the period-end difference 
33
 Funds originating in other EU countries, such as Luxemburg, are not all required by law to list derivatives in this schedule. 
34
 Notice that 12 out of 13 funds report at 49 period ends corresponding CDS holdings and thus, without knowing about the 
existence of within-period data, one would have to rely on 49 instead of 57 observations. However, to fully exploit the 
information contained in within-period data, I include zeros for the 8 missing period-end values for which aggregate (within-
period) sales of CDS are available to account for the fact that these funds are CDS users during those periods. 
35
 In this case, the decrease in CDS notional amounts between past and present reporting dates was higher than the 
respective amount of aggregate (within-period) sales of CDS.  
36
 The annual fund turnover ratio is defined as the minimum of either aggregate sales or aggregate purchases of securities 
divided by the average 12-month TNA of the fund. See CRSP Guide (2012). Mutual funds use the exact timing and prices at 
which purchases and sales of securities take place when computing turnover. A turnover estimated based on, e.g., monthly 
data, is less precise than daily estimates because the transaction prices are approximated by the average price over the 
month. See Elton et al. (2010).  
37
 The difference is negative whenever the CDS notional decreases from the past to the present reporting date. 
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in CDS notional (the absolute value) from either the aggregate sales or purchases (whichever value is 
higher) and dividing the entire expression by the respective aggregate sales or purchases.  
Table 8 presents the distribution of the period-end difference in CDS notional, aggregate purchases of 
CDS, aggregate sales of CDS (within-period), the (approximated) CDS turnover ratio and the missing 
trades for the 56 observations. Differences in these estimates result from missing round-trip CDS 
transactions over the half-year. Additionally, for a smaller subsample of 43 observations (for which 
within-period data on long and short CDS are available), the fraction of aggregate purchases of long 
CDS out of aggregate purchases of CDS is determined. The increase of CDS, implied by period-end 
data, ranged up to $818 mio., while the decrease of CDS was generally smaller and reached $577 
mio. The aggregate CDS purchases ranged from ca. $0.5 mio. to $8,151 mio. and aggregate CDS sales 
from ca. $4 mio. to $8,186 mio. The CDS turnover was, on average, around 6.73 times higher than a 
fund’s average CDS holdings implied by period-end data. The median (75th-percentile) CDS turnover 
was around 0.94 (4.20) times higher than a fund’s average CDS holdings. The variation in this number 
was large, with the highest CDS turnover being 140 times higher than a fund’s average CDS holdings, 
indicating a high level of heterogeneity across portfolios in terms of CDS use. Thus, almost half of the 
observed cumulative amounts of CDS traded over the course of a period (either frequently turned 
over in smaller amounts or infrequently in higher amounts) were higher than a fund’s average CDS 
holdings as implied by period-end data. 
The variable missing trades shows that changes in CDS holdings implied by period-end data, on 
average, reflect 37.34% of aggregate CDS trades derived from period-end and within-period data. For 
observations that equal to or lie above the median, between 67.28% and 100% of aggregate CDS 
trades remain undetected; 100% of aggregate CDS are unobserved whenever a fund undertakes 
round-trip CDS trades without showing any CDS on reporting date. Additionally, Figure 7 shows the 
development of the median missing CDS trades over time. A high fraction of aggregate CDS trades 
not explained by period-end differences was observable in every second half of the year between 
2007 and 2010. As shown in Figure 1, the number of funds reporting CDS within-period also 
increased in every second half of the year between 2007 and 2010, suggesting that some funds 
undertook many round-trip CDS trades in the second half of the year. The reasons for this timing 
remain unclear.38 
As shown in Table 9, 39 of the 56 period-end differences in CDS notional were positive, indicating an 
increase of CDS by funds, and 17 were negative, suggesting a decrease of CDS in the respective half-
38
 These funds might use CDS for portfolio rebalancing or window-dressing at year end (Elton et al. (2010)). 
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years. Interestingly, the aggregate sales and purchases of funds that decreased CDS in the respective 
period were higher than the aggregate sales and purchases of funds that increased CDS in the 
respective period for the entire sample. At the same time, a smaller fraction of missing trades was 
observable for funds that decreased CDS over the course of the period, as compared to funds that 
increased CDS. This indicates that funds decreasing CDS trade higher amounts of CDS less frequently 
(keep the CDS positions in their portfolios for a longer time period). By contrast, funds that increased 
CDS in the respective period undertook more CDS trades (purchases and sales or sales and purchases 
of CDS) within-periods that remained undetected. This shows that these funds either frequently 
turned over small amounts of CDS, which could have been in line with their investment strategy (e.g., 
short-term orientation), or misrepresented actual CDS holdings at period end because funds using 
CDS mainly for non-speculative reasons (e.g., hedging or synthesizing bonds), would keep these 
positions open in their portfolios for a longer time period.  
The aggregate (within-period) sales of individual long and short CDS are known for a smaller 
subsample of 43 fund-half-years. Based on this additional information, it is observable that funds that 
increased CDS in the respective period (for median values, not average values) increased more long 
CDS than short positions. Funds that decreased CDS during the same time period decreased more 
short CDS than long positions (both for average and median values). However, definite conclusions 
about the purpose of CDS use require the portfolio holdings of funds and a wider database. 
Overall, almost half of the observed cumulative amounts of CDS sold between the two consecutive 
reporting dates were higher than a fund’s average CDS holdings, as implied by period-end data. The 
above evidence further suggests that management undertook many round-trip CDS trades 
(purchases followed by sales or the other way around) within periods that remained undetected, with 
some funds trading CDS repeatedly in the second half of the calendar year. In particular, funds that 
increased CDS undertook more undetectable round-trip CDS trades than the funds that decreased 
CDS during the same time period. Thus, either these funds frequently turned over small amounts of 
CDS following their general investment policy or misrepresented CDS holdings at period end. Further 
examination of these issues might be a promising field for further research. 
5.3 The Comparison of Disclosed CDS Holdings and Report Comments of Funds  
The derivative and leverage policies of mutual funds are important for regulators, especially when it 
comes to adequate disclosure by market participants, as indicated by various SEC publications (e.g., 




(2011)). This study examines the CDS related risk information disclosures in annual and semi-annual 
reports of U.S. and German funds to check whether the long and short CDS holdings aggregated at 
the fund level are consistent with the comments in the annual and semi-annual reports of funds at 
the same reporting date. The direct comparison of comments and CDS positions provides insight into 
one aspect of the investment behavior and disclosure policy of U.S. and German corporate bond 
funds. Furthermore, this demonstrates the usefulness of the information disclosed to the investors.  
The studies of Hodder, Koonce, and McAnally (2001), Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Lajili and Zeghal 
(2005), together with the newest CFA Reports (2011) and (2013), show that the disclosure of risk by 
public companies is often of limited use to shareholders due to the lack of uniformity, clarity, and 
quantification. Furthermore, not only the quantity, but also the content, determines the quality of 
disclosures. Hoering and Gruendl (2011) report that there are still large inter-insurer and inter-
cultural differences in risk disclosure, while Malafronte, Porzio, and Starita (2013) find that the annual 
reports of insurers are difficult to read. Regarding the disclosures of mutual funds, the SEC letter to 
the General Counsel of the Investment Company Institute (2010) stresses that there is a wide variety 
of derivative disclosures, ranging from highly abbreviated “to lengthy, often highly technical, 
disclosures that detail a wide variety of potential derivative transactions without explaining the 
relevance to the fund’s investment operations.”39 Additionally, the SEC highlights that risks faced by 
funds should be explained in connection with the respective derivative strategies. The SEC is 
concerned about the descriptions, which often give the impression that a fund faces high exposure 
when it actually does not, and vice versa.40 For example, the Oppenheimer Champion Income Fund 
was blamed by the public for its generic, boilerplate disclosure. 
Given the differences in disclosure regulation between both countries (presented in section 3), I focus 
on annual- and semi-annual fund report comments in order to compare stated CDS strategies with 
disclosed CDS holdings between 2004 and 2010.  
5.3.1 The Nature of CDS Related Comments Disclosed by U.S. Funds 
All U.S. funds are required to comment on their holding positions, including various derivative 
positions, in the notes section of their reports. The Appendix contains an example of comments on 
CDS provided by a U.S. fund. In addition, the majority using CDS (12 out of 19) irregularly indicated 
the use of derivatives and associated risks in the section of the report that contains a short discussion 
of fund performance. For the purpose of this study, I only focus on the comments on CDS use in the 
39
 SEC Letter to the GCotICI (2010), p. 2-3.  
40
 See SEC Letter to the GCotICI (2010), p. 3-4. 
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report notes. In general, notes were shorter from 2004 to 2007 than from 2008 to 2010. Between 
2004 and 2007, funds always provided a short technical definition of CDS, some comments on 
valuation (mark to market), and short remarks on the strategies behind CDS use. Starting in 2008, the 
information content within the notes became higher due to the increase in explanatory notes on the 
technical functioning of different CDS types and on various risks associated with CDS use. 
Additionally, the notes often provided more detailed information regarding a fund’s CDS strategies, 
the amount at risk, and triggering events. This observable change was due to an amendment to the 
FAS 13341, which requires more extensive disclosure. In particular, the amendment requires funds to 
state the nature and the terms of derivatives, give reasons for entering into those instruments, 
specify events that require the seller to perform under a contract, and describe the current status of 
the payment/performance risk with regard to the contract. Moreover, funds have to post information 
about the highest potential amount that the fund could be liable for as a contract seller, the fair value 
of the contract, and the nature of any recourse provisions/assets held either as collateral or by third 
parties. 
As discussed in section 2, funds enter into long CDS and short CDS for various purposes. Beyond 
offsetting existing long CDS positions, funds may use CDS selling protection to gain exposure to risk by 
timing credit markets and creating levered or unlevered bond positions. Over and above hedging 
portfolio risks, funds may use CDS buying protection to perform negative basis trades or to time 
credit markets. All 19 funds that use CDS commented on their holdings in 192 half-years. These 
comments on CDS were in line with the disclosed CDS holdings because almost all of the funds stated 
that they entered into CDS contracts to buy or sell protection on an underlying position – this general 
comment formulation justifies every CDS strategy applied by a fund for any purpose. Funds rarely 
made concrete and specific statements about CDS related strategies. In particular, the 13 funds that 
did not have long CDS, i.e., they pursued short CDS strategies for non-hedging purposes, stated to 
buy and sell CDS for a wider range of purposes in 53 out of 192 half-years (not reported). Only two 
funds stated and actually only used short CDS in 17 half-years. Surprisingly, while not having short 
CDS, i.e., pursuing long CDS strategies, 4 out of the 19 funds that used CDS stated to buy and sell CDS 
for a wider range of purposes in 7 out of 192 half-years. Only one fund stated and actually only used 
long CDS in 2 half-years. Furthermore, the CDS comments of funds belonging to one fund family (i.e., 
PIMCO, Fidelity, Vanguard) were close to identical. This is in line with the SEC observation that 
41
 See FASB Staff Position No. FAS 133-1 and FIN 45-4, “Disclosures about Credit Derivatives and Certain Guarantees: An 
Amendment of FASB Statement No. 133 and FASB Interpretation No. 45.” The amendment extends the interpretation of 
FASB Statement No. 133 (“FAS 133”), “Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities”, and the FASB 
Interpretation No. 45 (“FIN 45”), “Guarantor’s Accounting and Disclosure Requirements for Guarantees, Including Indirect 
Guarantees of Indebtedness of Others.” See FASB ASC 815-10 (2009). 
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comments are often prepared for a particular fund family and not for a specific fund (SEC Letter to 
the GCotICI (2010)). Thus, U.S. funds could have been more specific about their CDS strategies in 60 
out of 192 half-years. These findings further indicate that funds only pursuing short CDS strategies, 
which are associated with non-hedging activities, give the impression of using long and short CDS for 
a wider range of purposes. It remains unclear whether they do this intentionally or unintentionally. 
As previously mentioned, the quantity of information provided in the notes has increased since 2008. 
For example, starting in 2008, the information content within the notes increased for PIMCO and 
Vanguard funds. This is primarily due to the increase in explanatory notes on the technical 
functioning of different CDS types (e.g., distinguishing between CDS on corporate or sovereign bonds, 
indices and asset-backed securities) and on the fund’s CDS strategies. Although extensive information 
is provided, no new insights are generated regarding the strategic use of CDS, as previously criticized 
by the SEC.  
Moreover, it is often directly (or indirectly) stated that CDS are priced according to the mark to 
market standard, although the potential obligations amount to the notional value for sold CDS. 
However, funds can mention the latter information in the footnotes of the respective portfolio 
holdings or in the notes, while not necessarily giving the overall notional amount of short CDS. For 
example, starting in 2009, Fidelity funds mention that the notional amount describes the highest 
potential loss that can occur due to sold CDS as well as provide an absolute amount and a fraction of 
the net asset value put at risk during a specific period (see the Appendix). The figures were in line 
with disclosed CDS notional amounts observed in the data. Additionally, since the second half of 
2009, Fidelity Funds give the precise amount of net collateral pledged as well as the amount that 
should be paid beyond that point (assuming all contracts are triggered).42 This last piece of 
information is only provided by some funds within the notes, while other funds usually mention the 
amount of collateral pledged of the respective positions in the footnotes to the portfolio holdings. 
Overall, the previous analyses reveal that fund comments could be improved in the interest of the 
investors. For example, it seems to be useful if funds provide information about derivative use and 
possible consequences within the performance discussion at the beginning of the reports in addition 
42
 The 2010 semi-annual report for Fidelity Intermediate Bond Fund states: “The total notional amount of all credit default 
swaps open at period end where the Fund is the seller of protection amounted to $4,324 representing 0.1% of net assets. 
Credit default swaps are considered to have credit-risk contingent features since they require payment by the seller of 
protection to the buyer of protection upon the occurrence of a defined credit event. The total value of credit default swaps 
in a net liability position as of period end was $(3,656). The value of assets posted as collateral, net of assets received as 
collateral, for these swaps was $2,907. If a defined credit event had occurred as of period end for swaps in a net liability 
position, the swaps' credit-risk-related contingent features would have been triggered and the Fund would have been 
required to pay $4,324, less the value of the swaps' related reference obligations." Report (Notes), p. 34-35. 
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to the notes section. Reducing and standardizing the very extensive CDS related comments, e.g., 
regarding the details about the functioning of CDS from contract initiation to termination could also 
be a valuable improvement. Avoiding the use of unspecific statements about a fund’s CDS related 
strategies could also benefit investors because funds only pursuing short CDS strategies (for non-
hedging purposes) often – intentionally or unintentionally – report to use long and short CDS for a 
wider range of purposes. Furthermore, mentioning the highest aggregate notional amount that could 
be due in a specific period because of sold CDS (as a fraction of the TNA) as well as the precise 
amount of net collateral pledged and additional necessary payments if all contracts are triggered 
within the notes might be an improvement for a potential investor. The existence and mandatory 
application of a compact and standardized template for CDS related text that incorporates the above 
features, which are already required by law, could increase understanding, and the value of 
information. 
Altogether, these results confirm many former SEC findings (SEC Letter to the GCotICI (2010)) with 
regard to the lengthy, highly technical, and unspecific disclosure policies of mutual funds. They 
further highlight that the disclosures of U.S. funds and public companies (e.g., Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004), Lajili and Zeghal (2005), CFA Reports (2011) and (2013)) similarly lack uniformity, clarity, and 
overemphasize quantity over quality of reporting. Although there is a lot of information given, the 
value of this information for the reader should be evaluated by further research and regulators. 
5.3.2 The Nature of CDS Related Comments Disclosed by German Funds 
Opposed to U.S. fund reports, the public reports of German funds contain only a brief description of a 
fund’s investment strategy during the specific period and occasionally whether CDS are used for 
“hedging” and/or “investment purposes” (e.g., for synthesizing a bond or for speculating). From an 
investor’s perspective, it is important to know whether German funds that voluntarily comment on 
their CDS holdings do so truthfully. For the sample of German funds, only 9 out of the 19 that used 
CDS directly commented on CDS use in 25 out of 106 half-years (23.58%). As shown in Figure 8, the 
number of funds commenting on CDS use increased from 1 fund in the second half of 2006 to 6 funds 
in 2010. Four funds that used CDS suggest that they never used credit derivatives.  
As reported in Table 10, German funds that commented on CDS use had significantly higher CDS 
holdings (as related to a fund's TNA) at the end of reporting period than funds that did not comment 
on CDS. In particular, the short CDS positions are significantly higher for funds that commented on 
CDS use, indicating that the funds that were higher exposed to risk provided additional information to 




shows that 3 out of 9 funds suggested hedging with CDS in 8 out of 25 (32%) half-years, while 
pursuing both long and short CDS strategies for a wider range of purposes. In all of these cases, short 
CDS positions were always high and, in 6 cases, even significantly outweighed long CDS positions at 
the respective period ends. This indicates a heightened fund exposure to risk, whereas the funds 
reported to hedge with CDS. These misleading statements are summarized in Table 11, where the 8 
misleading CDS comments (author’s translation) are compared to relevant CDS holdings on the 
particular reporting date. By looking at the comments around the highlighted periods, I found that 
they differed from those highlighted as misleading (not reported). Additionally, although these 3 
funds stopped commenting on CDS use, they did not stop using CDS (2 of the 3 funds also used CDS 
before they started to comment on them for the first time). For those particular cases, one cannot 
rule out the possibility that funds intentionally wanted to misguide investors. 
By contrast, U.S. funds that did not use long CDS often reported to buy and sell CDS for a wider range 
of purposes in 53 out of 192 half-years. In Germany, only 2 out of the 9 funds that did not use long 
CDS stated to buy and sell CDS for a wider range of purposes in 2 out of 25 half-years. By contrast, for 
funds that did not have short CDS, i.e., pursued long CDS strategies, 2 out of 9 stated to buy and sell 
CDS in 3 out of 25 half-years for a wider range of purposes (in the U.S., 7 out of 192 half-years). 
Moreover, one fund stated to only use short CDS (associated with non-hedging purposes) even 
though it used long CDS positions in 2 half-years. Only one fund stated and actually used long CDS in 
2 half-years. In total, German funds made 8 misleading statements and could have been more specific 
about their CDS strategies in 7 additional cases out of 25 half-years (in the U.S., the issue of unspecific 
comments occurred in 60 out of 192 half-years). The comments in the extended prospectuses (terms 
of contract) were also very general or strictly followed the wording of the law. Thus, based on the 
report comments on derivatives, investors could have only guessed about the way funds distributed 
in Germany used financial instruments during this time period. All proposals for improvements to U.S 
fund disclosure policies made in the previous subsection should also be considered by regulators for 
EU-wide fund disclosure policies. 
Although different levels of transparency with respect to the information provided to investors are 
observable in both countries, analyses performed for U.S. and German corporate bond funds show 
the high level of flexibility that funds have when commenting on their derivative strategies, which 
may misguide investors. The results suggest that investors have to analyze portfolio holdings in order 
to learn about the true investment behavior of funds because CDS comments are often unspecific or 




expect a high level of protection from regulation, U.S. and German/EU regulators should monitor the 
investment and disclosure strategies pursued by mutual funds more intensively. 
6 Conclusion 
This study analyzes the level of potential losses from CDS holdings at U.S. and German corporate 
bond funds together with the CDS related disclosures during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 under 
the regulation existing at that time. In particular, I investigate whether the potential risks associated 
with the use of CDS are properly reflected in the information provided to investors in the annual and 
semi-annual reports of funds in the U.S. and Germany. The goal is to determine whether investors 
need to worry about funds potentially taking extensive risks through the use of CDS and misinforming 
the public about their CDS policies. From prior research (e.g., Gałkiewicz (2014)), it is known that 
funds in the U.S. and Germany face high levels of flexibility. Depending on the types of derivatives 
used, funds in both countries can reach a point at which default is theoretically possible solely due to 
their investments into derivatives, e.g., by investing into short CDS with a notional amount equal to 
(and in Germany/the EU even higher than) the value of a fund’s net assets. 
In general, CDS use was extensive and increased over time for both U.S. and German funds between 
2004 and 2010. Although less experienced in using CDS, German funds had higher and more varying 
CDS positions on the individual fund level since 2007. Especially noticeable is the fact that U.S. and 
German funds stayed net short and kept the highest levels of CDS selling protection during the 
middle of the financial crisis and thus, likely further increased their overall risk during this time 
period. For some funds in the U.S., the potential for realizing losses via CDS selling protection, as 
determined by the sum of notional amounts (following U.S. law), was almost as high as a fund’s TNA, 
while in Germany, this potential was sometimes even higher than a fund’s TNA. Thus, funds are able 
to circumvent the direct leverage restrictions, which limit bank borrowing to 10% and 33.3% of TNA 
in Germany/the EU and the U.S., respectively, by using derivatives, such as CDS, and inflate overall 
leverage to levels that lie above the value of net assets. This is cause for concern as the high level of 
flexibility was not originally envisaged by regulators and might not be in the best interest of investors. 
Although definite conclusions about speculation require the portfolio holdings of funds, this study 
shows that the prevalent regulation might not sufficiently protect investors from extreme losses.  
The additional analysis of the CDS trading activity of German funds between two consecutive 
reporting dates highlights that the purchases and sales of CDS observable from one period-end to the 
next explain approximately one third of the aggregate CDS purchases or sales implied by period-end 




suggests that period-end data overlooks many round-trip CDS trades (purchases followed by sales or 
the other way around) undertaken by management. 
Regarding the analysis of information funds provide about their CDS use, the results suggest that 
investors have to analyze portfolio holdings in order to learn about the true investment behavior of 
funds in both countries because comments on CDS contained in the periodic reports are often 
unspecific and even sometimes misleading. For instance, in Germany, funds that sold more CDS 
protection than they bought often stated to only buy CDS protection for hedging purposes.  
Based on the aforementioned results, it seems advisable that regulators in both countries tighten 
rules restricting the speculative use of derivatives by funds to a reasonable level, as well as 
implement more standardized disclosure policies. Stronger restrictions on the speculative use of 
derivatives would not affect the majority of U.S. or German funds, but could benefit the mutual fund 
industry as a whole by preventing potentially high, and long-lasting, losses due to outliers. Overall, 
the analyses presented document potential limitations of mutual fund regulation in the U.S. and 
Germany/the EU with respect to CDS and highlight the existence of high risks. Given the potential 
harmful impacts on investors, as witnessed during the financial crisis, these findings are of significant 





An example of CDS related comments in a U.S. fund report 
The following Quote presents an excerpt from the notes part of the annual report from August 31, 
2010 of the Fidelity Intermediate Bond Fund:  
“The Fund entered into credit default swaps as a seller to gain credit exposure to an issuer and/or as 
a buyer to provide a measure of protection against defaults of an issuer. The issuer may be either a 
single issuer or a "basket" of issuers. Periodic payments are made over the life of the contract 
provided that no credit event occurs. For credit default swaps on most corporate and sovereign 
issuers, credit events include bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation acceleration or 
repudiation/moratorium. For credit default swaps on asset-backed securities, a credit event may be 
triggered by events such as failure to pay principal, maturity extension, rating downgrade or write-
down. For credit default swaps on asset-backed securities, the reference obligation described 
represents the security that may be put to the seller. As a seller, if an underlying credit event occurs, 
the Fund will either pay the buyer an amount equal to the notional amount of the swap and take 
delivery of the reference obligation or underlying securities comprising an index or pay a net 
settlement amount of cash equal to the notional amount of the swap less the recovery value of the 
reference obligation or underlying securities comprising an index. The notional amount of credit 
default swaps is included in the Schedule of Investments and approximates the maximum potential 
amount of future payments that the Fund could be required to make if the Fund is the seller and a 
credit event were to occur. The total notional amount of all credit default swaps open at period end 






Figure 1: The development of the number of U.S. and German corporate bond funds reporting the 
use of CDS between 2004 and 2010 
This figure shows the development of the number of U.S. (US) and German (DE) corporate bond 
funds that report using CDS at period end and the number of German funds that report using CDS 
within period between 2004 and 2010. Out of the 30 funds from each country (60 total), 19 funds 
report using CDS at some point between 2004 and 2010 – 192 times in the U.S. and 106 times in 
Germany. Additionally, 13 German funds report using CDS occurring within period at some point in 
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Figure 2: The development of total CDS positions of U.S. and German funds that report using CDS 
between 2004 and 2010 
This figure shows the average total notional amount of all CDS outstanding divided by total net assets 
at a particular period end for U.S. and German corporate bond funds. The respective median (md) 
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Figure 3: The development of long and short CDS positions of U.S. and German corporate bond 
funds between 2004 and 2010 
This figure shows the development of the average CDS long and short positions at a particular period 
end for U.S. and German funds. CDS notional amounts are normalized by the fund’s total net asset 









































Long CDS (DE) 
Long CDS (US) 
Short CDS (DE) 
Short CDS (US) 
Long CDS (DE) (md) 
Long CDS (US) (md) 
Short CDS (DE) (md) 




Figure 4: The development of the net CDS positions of U.S. and German corporate bond funds and 
the credit risk premium 
This figure presents the development of the average CDS net notional positions (long CDS – short 
CDS) as a fraction (frac.) of a fund’s TNA for U.S. and German CDS users and the level of the general 
credit risk premium represented by BBB yield – Treasury yield between 2004 and 2010 at a particular 
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Figure 5: The development of long and short CDS positions and half-year returns of Deka-
CorporateBond Euro (top30de fund no. 30) 
This figure shows the development of the Deka-CorporateBond Euro fund’s CDS long and short 
positions at a particular period end together with its half-year returns between 2004 and 2010. CDS 
















































Figure 6: The development of long and short CDS positions and half-year returns of Putnam 
Diversified Income Trust (top30us fund no. 14)  
This figure shows the development of the Putnam Diversified Income Trust’s CDS long and short 
positions at a particular period end together with its half-year returns between 2004 and 2010. CDS 














































Figure 7: The development of the median number of missing CDS trades of German funds over time 
This figure shows the development of the median number of missing CDS trades as a fraction of 














































Figure 8: The development of the number of CDS comments and misleading CDS comments of 
German funds between 2004 and 2010 
This figure shows the development of the number of CDS comments and misleading CDS comments 












































Table 1: The largest U.S. funds (top30us) as measured by TNA on June 30, 2004 (CRSP) 
 
No. Fund family name: Fund name TNA in mio. $ 
1 PIMCO Funds: Pacific Investment Management Series: Total Return Fund 73,202.1 
2 Vanguard Fixed Income Securities Funds: Vanguard Short-Term Corporate Fund 17,751.5 
3 Bond Fund of America, Inc 17,620.6 
4 PIMCO Funds: Pacific Investment Management Series: Low Duration Fund 14,469.9 
5 American High-Income Trust 8,895.6 
6 Vanguard Fixed Income Securities Funds: Vanguard High-Yield Corporate Fund 8,743.3 
7 Lord Abbett Bond-Debenture Fund, Inc 8,211.8 
8 Pioneer High Yield Fund, Inc 7,664.5 
9 Fidelity Commonwealth Trust: Fidelity Intermediate Bond Fund 6,774.7 
10 PIMCO Funds: Pacific Investment Management Series: High Yield Fund 6,759.0 
11 Dodge & Cox Income Fund 6,629.0 
12 Oppenheimer Strategic Funds Trust: Oppenheimer Strategic Income Fund 6,181.8 
13 Fidelity Fixed-Income Trust: Fidelity Investment Grade Bond Fund 5,732.3 
14 Putnam Diversified Income Trust 5,533.0 
15 Fidelity Fixed-Income Trust: Fidelity Short-Term Bond Fund 5,044.6 
16 Intermediate Bond Fund of America 5,039.4 
17 Evergreen Select Fixed Income Trust: Evergreen Core Bond Fund 4,517.3 
18 Vanguard Fixed Income Securities Funds: Vanguard Long-Term Corporate Fund 4,444.0 
19 Vanguard Fixed Income Securities Funds: Vanguard Intermediate-Term Corporate Fund 4,225.9 
20 MainStay Funds: MainStay High Yield Corporate Bond Fund 4,225.7 
21 Fidelity Summer Street Trust: Fidelity Capital & Income Fund 4,148.9 
22 SEI Institutional Managed Trust: Core Fixed Income Portfolio 3,949.2 
23 T Rowe Price High Yield Fund, Inc 3,897.0 
24 Western Asset Funds, Inc: Western Asset Core Plus Bond Portfolio 3,431.0 
25 Putnam High Yield Trust 2,938.0 
26 Franklin High Income Trust: AGE High Income Fund 2,849.0 
27 AXP Diversified Bond Fund, Inc 2,816.7 
28 Fidelity Fixed-Income Trust: High Income Fund 2,785.9 
29 Calvert Fund: Calvert Income Fund 2,776.5 






Table 2: The largest German funds (top30de) as measured by TNA on December 31, 2004 (BVI) 
   No. Fund family name: Fund name TNA in mio. $ 
1 Allianz GI Lux: dit-Euro Bond Total Return 6,303.1 
2 DEKA: RenditDeka 6,166.6 
3 DWS: DWS Vermögensbildungsfonds R 4,521.0 
4 ACTIVEST LUXEMBOURG S.A.: Activest TotalReturn 3,521.7 
5 DWS: DWS Select-Rent 2,837.4 
6 DIT: dit-Allianz Rentenfonds 2,707.2 
7 DIT: DIT-EURO RENTENFONDS >>K<< 2,662.3 
8 UIL S.A.: UniEuroKapital Corporates A 1,855.3 
9 DWS S.A.: DWS Euro-Bonds (Medium) 1,817.1 
10 GERLING INVESTMENT: Gerling Rendite Fonds 1,680.1 
11 DekaLux-Bond 1,451.4 
12 DWS S.A.: DWS Euro-Corp Bonds 1,449.5 
13 DIT: dit-Allianz Mobil-Fonds 1,425.4 
14 UNION S.A.: UniEuroRenta Corporates 1,263.8 
15 UNION S.A.: UniPlusKapital DM (Lux) 1,254.4 
16 DEKA: DekaTresor 997.2 
17 Ring-Rentenfonds DWS 921.9 
18 DIT-EURO RENTENFONDS 919.4 
19 MEAG EuroRent 875.6 
20 UIP: UniEuroRenta 873.5 
21 DWS Inrenta 840.5 
22 DWS Invest Euro Bonds (Short) FC 761.1 
23 DWS Euro-Bonds (Short) 747.4 
24 Union Investment Lux.: UniEuroKapital II 746.7 
25 UIP: UniEuroRenta Absolute Return 710.5 
26 WestAM: Mundo I Invest 709.7 
27 MEAG ProRent 702.5 
28 FRANKFURT-TRUST: Basis-Fonds I 664.0 
29 DWS Euro-Bonds (Long) 596.4 




Table 3: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for the total net asset value (TNA), CDS notional (sum of long and short positions), long CDS notional, short CDS notional, 
CDS net notional (long – short positions), and the unrealized value change in mio. $ of German and U.S. funds that reported using CDS in a particular half-year 
between 2004 and 2010. 19 out of the 30 U.S. funds report using CDS 192 times, and 19 out of the 30 German funds report using CDS 106 times. 
Country Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Germany TNA (in mio. $) 106 1,627 1,928 239 673 1,002 1,600 10,383 
 
CDS notional (in mio. $) 106 175 230 1 42 96 230 1,383 
 
Long CDS notional (in mio. $) 106 75 161 0 0 33 99 1,169 
 
Short CDS notional (in mio. $) 106 100 123 0 15 59 141 562 
 
CDS net notional (in mio. $) 106 -25 172 -458 -94 -17 23 1,079 
 
Unrealized value change (in mio. $) 106 0 3 -8 -1 0 0 14 
 
CDS use 106 1 0 
     
          USA TNA (in mio. $) 192 16,076 34,457 781 4,515 7,005 10,134 252,184 
 
CDS notional (in mio. $) 192 1,181 3,657 1 62 221 668 33,778 
 
Long CDS notional (in mio. $) 192 289 1,001 0 0 17 163 11,118 
 
Short CDS notional (in mio. $) 192 893 2,937 0 32 156 483 31,059 
 
CDS net notional (in mio. $) 192 -604 2,425 -28,341 -358 -88 -4 393 
 
Unrealized value change (in mio. $) 192 -25 127 -1,172 -8 0 1 252 
 
CDS use 192 1 0 
     
          Total TNA (in mio. $) 298 10,936 28,511 239 1,331 4,624 7,760 252,184 
 
CDS notional (in mio. $) 298 823 2,975 1 52 149 405 33,778 
 
Long CDS notional (in mio. $) 298 212 815 0 0 22 125 11,118 
 
Short CDS notional (in mio. $) 298 611 2,387 0 21 102 303 31,059 
 
CDS net notional (in mio. $) 298 -398 1,967 -28,341 -225 -38 1 1,079 
 
Unrealized value change (in mio. $) 298 -16 102 -1,172 -3 0 0 252 




Table 4: Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for CDS notional (sum of long and short positions), long CDS notional, short CDS notional, CDS net notional (long – short 
positions), and the unrealized value change as a fraction of a fund’s total net asset value (TNA) (in %) of German and U.S. funds that report using CDS in a 
particular half-year between 2004 and 2010. 19 out of the 30 U.S. funds report using CDS 192 times, and 19 out of the 30 German funds report using CDS 106 
times. 
Country Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Germany CDS notional (in % of TNA) 106 17.33% 25.05% 0.05% 2.96% 7.86% 21.75% 160.89% 
 Long CDS notional (in % of TNA) 106 6.43% 9.12% 0.00% 0.00% 1.93% 10.37% 41.04% 
 Short CDS notional (in % of TNA) 106 10.91% 18.50% 0.00% 1.38% 5.09% 12.16% 127.04% 
 CDS net notional (in % of TNA) 106 -4.48% 14.94% -93.19% -7.49% -1.46% 2.18% 21.22% 
 Unrealized value change (in % of TNA) 106 -0.10% 0.28% -1.63% -0.11% -0.03% 0.00% 0.50% 
          
USA CDS notional (in % of TNA) 192 7.84% 15.75% 0.02% 0.87% 2.95% 7.67% 129.09% 
 Long CDS notional (in % of TNA) 192 2.37% 5.65% 0.00% 0.00% 0.36% 2.18% 37.71% 
 Short CDS notional (in % of TNA) 192 5.47% 11.12% 0.00% 0.48% 2.03% 5.96% 93.82% 
 CDS net notional (in % of TNA) 192 -3.10% 7.95% -58.54% -3.51% -1.32% -0.08% 11.92% 
 Unrealized value change (in % of TNA) 192 -0.25% 0.83% -8.10% -0.16% 0.00% 0.01% 0.68% 
          
Total CDS notional (in % of TNA) 298 11.21% 20.05% 0.02% 1.50% 4.17% 10.96% 160.89% 
 Long CDS notional (in % of TNA) 298 3.81% 7.33% 0.00% 0.00% 0.50% 3.60% 41.04% 
 Short CDS notional (in % of TNA) 298 7.40% 14.40% 0.00% 0.73% 2.50% 7.55% 127.04% 
 CDS net notional (in % of TNA) 298 -3.59% 10.95% -93.19% -4.97% -1.40% 0.05% 21.22% 
 Unrealized value change (in % of TNA) 298 -0.19% 0.69% -8.10% -0.14% -0.01% 0.01% 0.68% 




Table 5: T-test for differences in means of CDS holdings of U.S. and German funds 
This table reports the results of the t-test for differences in means of CDS holdings of U.S. and German bond funds that report using CDS in a particular half-year 
between 2004 and 2010. Panel A provides results for the following variables: CDS notional (sum of long and short positions), long CDS notional, short CDS 
notional, CDS net notional (long – short positions), and the unrealized value change expressed in absolute dollar terms, while Panel B reports results for the 
same variables expressed as a fraction of a fund’s total net asset value (TNA). The last column reports p-values of Levene's test for the equality of group 
variances. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Standard errors are presented in brackets. 
Variable German funds U.S. funds Difference (d_se)  Levene's test (p-value) 
Panel A: Variables in mio. $       
TNA (in mio. $) 1,626.6800 16,076.2200 -14,449.5400*** (2493.7600) (0.0000) 
CDS notional (in mio. $) 174.6153 1,181.0810 -1,006.465*** (246.8322) (0.0000) 
Long CDS notional (in mio. $) 74.6085 288.5282 -213.9197*** (73.9182) (0.0003) 
Short CDS notional (in mio. $) 100.0068 892.5524 -792.5456*** (212.2812) (0.0000) 
CDS net notional (in mio. $) -25.3983 -604.0242 578.6259*** (175.8362) (0.0007) 
Unrealized value change (in mio. $) -0.4031 -24.5986 24.1955*** (9.1378) (0.0000) 
      
Panel B: Variables as a frac. of TNA      
CDS notional (as a frac. of TNA) 0.1733 0.0784 0.0950*** (0.0269) (0.0000) 
Long CDS notional (as a frac. of TNA) 0.0643 0.0237 0.0406*** (0.0097) (0.0000) 
Short CDS notional (as a frac. of TNA) 0.1091 0.0547 0.0544*** (0.0197) (0.0003) 
CDS net notional (as a frac. of TNA) -0.0448 -0.0310 -0.0138 (0.0156) (0.0000) 




Table 6: Summary statistics for individual top30us funds listed in Table 1 
This table reports summary statistics for short CDS notional and CDS net notional (long – short positions) as a fraction of a fund’s total net asset value (in %) of 
U.S. funds that report using CDS in a particular half-year between 2004 and 2010. 
Top30us Variable N mean sd p50 p75 max   Variable N mean sd p50 min max 
                1 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 4.99% 3.69% 4.80% 7.14% 12.32% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -3.03% 3.45% -1.61% -11.24% 0.09% 
2 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 1.15% 0.71% 1.35% 1.54% 2.31% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -0.97% 0.94% -1.35% -2.31% 0.42% 
4 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 5.31% 3.76% 3.90% 7.96% 13.19% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -4.66% 3.65% -3.08% -13.11% -0.42% 
7 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 4 0.17% 0.13% 0.20% 0.27% 0.27% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 4 -0.04% 0.17% 0.00% -0.27% 0.13% 
9 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 1.69% 1.14% 1.79% 2.51% 3.66% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -1.69% 1.14% -1.79% -3.66% -0.08% 
10 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 8.89% 4.51% 9.22% 11.94% 15.69% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -6.57% 3.73% -7.06% -12.44% 0.23% 
12 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 11 4.36% 4.61% 2.28% 10.42% 11.56% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 11 -1.86% 5.48% -0.03% -10.28% 6.33% 
13 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 2.51% 1.28% 2.67% 2.96% 5.42% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -1.82% 1.63% -1.52% -5.37% 0.42% 
14 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 21.30% 29.08% 9.72% 22.01% 93.82%   Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -4.60% 19.50% 1.11% -58.54% 11.92% 
15 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 1.96% 2.75% 1.70% 2.09% 10.57% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -1.93% 2.73% -1.70% -10.50% -0.02% 
17 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 5 3.24% 2.59% 3.26% 5.33% 6.26% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 5 -0.06% 6.71% -2.02% -5.80% 11.11% 
18 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 4 5.51% 0.94% 5.18% 6.04% 6.89% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 4 -5.40% 0.92% -5.08% -6.74% -4.69% 
19 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 0.36% 0.20% 0.37% 0.49% 0.73% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -0.22% 0.12% -0.20% -0.39% -0.03% 
22 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 11 1.82% 1.49% 1.93% 2.73% 4.95% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 11 0.22% 1.11% -0.01% -2.08% 1.76% 
23 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 8 0.46% 0.30% 0.43% 0.64% 0.97% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 8 -0.36% 0.52% -0.43% -0.97% 0.80% 
24 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 22.37% 16.95% 16.77% 30.25% 61.66% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -16.35% 16.22% -12.71% -54.46% 0.62% 
25 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 11 1.73% 1.35% 1.86% 2.92% 3.79% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 11 -1.24% 1.31% -0.54% -3.43% -0.01% 
27 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 5 0.09% 0.15% 0.00% 0.10% 0.36% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 5 0.42% 0.35% 0.51% 0.00% 0.75% 
30 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 3 0.95% 1.64% 0.00% 2.84% 2.84% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 3 1.19% 3.50% 2.84% -2.84% 3.56% 
                Total Short CDS (in % of TNA) 192 5.47% 11.12% 2.03% 5.96% 93.82% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 192 -3.10% 7.95% -1.32% -58.54% 11.92% 
 




Table 7: Summary statistics for individual top30de funds listed in Table 2 
This table reports summary statistics for short CDS notional, and CDS net notional (long – short positions) as a fraction of a fund’s total net asset value (in %) of 
German funds that report using CDS in a particular half-year between 2004 and 2010. 
Top30de Variable N mean sd p50 p75 max   Variable N mean sd p50 min max 
                1 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 13 7.75% 10.52% 2.40% 7.55% 36.66% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 13 -0.93% 13.99% -0.74% -34.87% 20.18% 
2 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 8 1.01% 0.94% 1.24% 1.50% 2.58% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 8 2.69% 3.37% 3.90% -2.58% 6.12% 
3 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 1 0.00% . 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 1 3.78% . 3.78% 3.78% 3.78% 
4 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 1 1.23% . 1.23% 1.23% 1.23% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 1 -1.23% . -1.23% -1.23% -1.23% 
5 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 2 1.58% 0.21% 1.58% 1.73% 1.73% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 2 -1.58% 0.21% -1.58% -1.73% -1.44% 
6 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 6 7.95% 5.45% 5.59% 12.95% 16.41% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 6 -5.95% 6.12% -5.37% -14.76% 3.03% 
7 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 6 3.47% 2.27% 3.37% 5.44% 6.60% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 6 -3.47% 2.27% -3.37% -6.60% -0.90% 
8 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 8 15.16% 13.25% 13.45% 23.54% 38.91% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 8 -6.50% 10.80% -1.26% -28.21% 1.52% 
9 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 7 10.53% 1.27% 10.85% 11.47% 12.16% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 7 -10.53% 1.27% -10.85% -12.16% -8.28% 
10 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 1 0.37% . 0.37% 0.37% 0.37% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 1 -0.37% . -0.37% -0.37% -0.37% 
11 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 7 2.31% 2.38% 1.20% 5.21% 5.40% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 7 3.83% 6.60% 4.26% -5.40% 10.38% 
12 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 7 31.95% 14.24% 37.08% 43.10% 46.91% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 7 -10.34% 17.49% -14.04% -27.61% 21.22% 
13 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 8 8.08% 8.58% 5.67% 10.13% 27.05% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 8 1.84% 5.57% 2.96% -8.44% 9.21% 
14 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 8 13.30% 14.24% 8.47% 23.22% 39.89% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 8 -3.30% 9.36% -0.78% -24.05% 7.22% 
16 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 3 1.65% 0.64% 1.47% 2.36% 2.36% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 3 -1.65% 0.64% -1.47% -2.36% -1.12% 
18 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 3 5.33% 7.28% 2.36% 13.62% 13.62% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 3 -4.60% 8.13% -2.36% -13.62% 2.18% 
20 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 4 0.03% 0.05% 0.00% 0.05% 0.11% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 4 1.41% 2.77% 0.08% -0.07% 5.57% 
23 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 5 7.65% 1.63% 7.49% 8.87% 9.69% 
 
Net notional (in % of TNA) 5 -7.65% 1.63% -7.49% -9.69% -5.93% 
30 Short CDS (in % of TNA) 8 38.59% 49.58% 18.16% 70.09% 127.04%   Net notional (in % of TNA) 8 -24.04% 40.62% -5.72% -93.19% 10.32% 
                Total Short CDS (in % of TNA) 106 10.91% 18.50% 5.09% 12.16% 127.04%   Net notional (in % of TNA) 106 -4.48% 14.94% -1.46% -93.19% 21.22% 




Table 8: Summary statistics for aggregate CDS, CDS turnover and missed trades of German funds from period-end and within-period CDS data 
This table reports summary statistics for the differences in CDS notional implied by period-end data, aggregate purchases and sales of CDS, CDS turnover, and 
missed trades implied by period-end and within-period CDS data of German bond funds. The variable period-end difference in CDS notional (in mio. $) shows 
the difference in CDS holdings between the present and the past reporting dates. The aggregate sales CDS notional (in mio. $) reflects the aggregate within-
period CDS sales reported by funds, while the aggregate purchases CDS notional (in mio. $) presents the aggregate purchases of CDS determined as the sum of 
the respective period-end difference in CDS notional and aggregate sales CDS notional. The aggregate sales of long CDS (as a fraction of aggregate sales CDS) 
presents the fraction of the aggregate sales CDS notional explained by aggregate sales of long CDS reported by funds in 43 periods, while the aggregate 
purchases of long CDS (as a fraction of aggregate purchases CDS) reports the fraction of the aggregate purchases CDS notional explained by the aggregate 
purchases of long CDS, both of which are scaled by the respective aggregate purchases or sales CDS notional. The CDS turnover ratio (as a fraction of average 
CDS notional) reflects the minimum of aggregate sales or purchases of CDS scaled by the average present and past period CDS notional of the fund. The missing 
trades (as a fraction of aggregate CDS) show the fraction of the higher of aggregate sales or purchases of CDS not explained by the period-end difference in CDS 
notional. 
Germany         
Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75     max 
Period-end difference in CDS notional (in mio. $) 56 23.5408 183.5515 -577.5111 -20.1476 7.7089 91.4164 818.1523 
Aggregate purchases CDS notional (in mio. $) 56 705.1489 1,593.5419 0.5392 43.4869 162.6237 519.4897 8,151.6802 
Aggregate purchases of long CDS (as a frac. of agg. purchases CDS) 43 0.4452 0.3623 0.0000 0.0387 0.5353 0.7472 1.0000 
Aggregate CDS sales notional (in mio. $) 56 681.6081 1,585.1466 3.9510 26.5422 115.6641 501.2390 8,186.6416 
Aggregate sales of long CDS (as a frac. of agg. sales CDS) 43 0.4630 0.3804 0.0000 0.0000 0.5074 0.8095 1.0000 
CDS turnover ratio (as a frac. of average CDS notional) 51 6.7317 20.7798 0.0248 0.3997 0.9379 4.2000 140.0000 




Table 9: Summary statistics for aggregate CDS, CDS turnover, and missed trades of German funds from period-end and within-period CDS data categorized by 
an increase or decrease in CDS observable at period ends 
This table reports the summary statistics for the same variables as in Table 8 (for variable definitions please refer to Table 8), but distinguishes between half-
years where increases or decreases in CDS are observable from the past to the present period end between 2004 and 2010. 
Germany         
Variable N mean sd min p25 p50 p75     max 
Increase in CDS from the past to the present period end         
Positive Period-end difference in CDS notional (in mio. $) 39 91.9121 145.3785 0.0000 5.1926 53.3732 124.6234 818.1523 
Aggregate purchases CDS notional (in mio. $) 39 574.8107 1,367.0104 9.3534 58.7928 172.4753 375.8271 7,691.8169 
Aggregate purchases of long CDS (as a frac. of agg. purchases CDS) 29 0.4784 0.3567 0.0000 0.1099 0.6022 0.7472 1.0000 
Aggregate CDS sales notional (in mio. $) 39 482.8986 1,323.5661 3.9510 24.0985 60.0127 212.8005 7,567.1934 
Aggregate sales of long CDS (as a frac. of agg. sales CDS) 29 0.4955 0.3804 0.0000 0.0909 0.5618 0.8095 1.0000 
Missed trades (as a frac. of agg. CDS notional) 39 0.6543 0.3177 0.0816 0.2982 0.7074 0.9647 1.0000 
         
Decrease in CDS from the past to the present period end         
Negative Period-end difference in CDS notional (in mio. $) 17 -133.3108 167.5813 -577.5111 -169.2292 -63.6070 -25.7500 -6.3877 
Aggregate purchases CDS notional (in mio. $) 17 1,004.1601 2,038.2583 0.5392 7.0403 92.4582 1,026.1670 8,151.6802 
Aggregate purchases of long CDS (as a frac. of agg. purchases CDS) 14 0.3766 0.3777 0.0000 0.0000 0.4030 0.6509 1.0000 
Aggregate CDS sales notional (in mio. $) 17 1,137.4709 2,039.5431 11.7768 73.6050 288.1200 1,246.6478 8,186.6416 
Aggregate sales of long CDS (as a frac. of agg. sales CDS) 14 0.3957 0.3856 0.0000 0.0000 0.4521 0.6666 1.0000 






Table 10: T-test for differences in means of CDS holdings of German funds that comment on CDS use versus those that do not comment  
This table shows the results of the t-test for differences in means of the following end-of-period variables for German funds that comment on CDS use versus 
those that do not comment: CDS notional (sum of long and short positions), long CDS notional, short CDS notional, CDS net notional (long – short positions), 
unrealized value change (expressed as a fraction of a fund’s total net asset value (TNA)), and the TNA in million $. The last column reports the p-values of 
Levene's test for the equality of group variances. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively. Standard errors are 
presented in brackets. 
Germany      
Variable No comments (N=81) CDS comments (N=25) Difference  (d_se)  Levene's test (p-value) 
TNA (in mio. $) 1,855.3420 885.8165 969.5250*** (258.7690) (0.0049) 
CDS notional (as a frac. of TNA) 0.1274 0.3221 -0.1947** (0.0543) (0.0000) 
Long CDS notional (as a frac. of TNA) 0.0489 0.1143 -0.0654*** (0.0200) (0.3740) 
Short CDS notional (as a frac. of TNA) 0.0785 0.2079 -0.1293* (0.0406) (0.0000) 







Table 11: Misleading report comments on CDS of German funds 
This table shows the misleading report comments on CDS and compares it to the fund’s TNA (in $), 
long CDS notional, and the short CDS notional at the respective reporting date (both expressed as a 
fraction of a fund’s TNA). Number (No.) refers to individual top30de funds listed in Table 2. 







8 30.09.2007 The management used various hedging instruments 
(so-called credit derivatives) to decrease the risks 
from the overall market and individual positions.  
(p. 96)  
1,210,245,700 0.0818 0.2623 
8 31.03.2008 The management used various hedging instruments 
(so-called credit derivatives) to decrease the risks 
from the overall market and individual positions.  
(p. 78) 
916,274,126 0.1070 0.3891 
12 31.12.2006 (The management) could further decrease the 
credit risks from corporate bonds and the variation 
in return differences as related to government 
bonds by using financial derivatives in the form of 
Credit Default Swaps. (p. 14) 
746,608,621 0.0000 0.0670 
12 30.06.2007 Beyond that, (the management) could further 
decrease the credit risks from corporate bonds and 
the volatility of the return differences as related to 
government bonds by using financial derivatives in 
the form of CDS (Credit Default Swaps). (p. 14) 
633,766,370 0.1183 0.3945 
12 31.12.2007 Besides, the management could further decrease 
the credit risks from corporate bonds and the 
volatility of their risk premia by using financial 
derivatives in the form of Credit Default Swaps 
(CDS). (p. 17) 
300,107,097 0.1638 0.4310 
12 30.06.2008 Beyond that, (the management) could further 
decrease the credit risks from corporate bonds and 
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